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Conference Papers Year : 2022

A New Key Recovery Side-Channel Attack on HQC with Chosen Ciphertext

Phlippe Gaborit
  • Function : Author

Abstract

Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) is a code-based candidate of NIST post-quantum standardization procedure. The decoding steps of code-based cryptosystems are known to be vulnerable to side-channel attacks and HQC is no exception to this rule. In this paper, we present a new key recovery side-channel attack on HQC with chosen ciphertext. Our attack takes advantage of the reuse of a static secret key on a micro-controller with a physical access. The goal is to retrieve the static secret key by targeting the Reed-Muller decoding step of the decapsulation and more precisely the Hadamard transform. This function is known for its diffusion property, a property that we exploit through side-channel analysis. The side-channel information is used to build an Oracle that distinguishes between several decoding patterns of the Reed-Muller codes. We show how to query the Oracle such that the responses give a full information about the static secret key. Experiments show that less than $20.000$ electromagnetic attack traces are sufficient to retrieve the whole static secret key used for the decapsulation. Finally, we present a masking-based countermeasure to thwart our attack.
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Dates and versions

cea-04057069 , version 1 (03-04-2023)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : cea-04057069 , version 1

Cite

Guillaume Goy, Antoine Loiseau, Phlippe Gaborit. A New Key Recovery Side-Channel Attack on HQC with Chosen Ciphertext. Fourth PQC Standardization Conference, Nov 2022, Washington, United States. ⟨cea-04057069⟩
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