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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2024

Efficiency and Application Fees in School Choice

Cyril Rouault
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Résumé

This paper examines the impact of application fees on student strategies within the deferred acceptance mechanism. We demonstrate that these fees can lead to Pareto-efficient allocations. However, they may also inhibit the existence of Nash equilibria that would result in assignments Pareto-dominating the student-optimal stable assignment. This issue always arises when application fees are positive for all students at a given school.
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hal-04630065 , version 1 (01-07-2024)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04630065 , version 1

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Cyril Rouault. Efficiency and Application Fees in School Choice. 2024. ⟨hal-04630065⟩
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