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Fault security analysis and verification: challenges and new directions

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
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Fault Security Analysis and Verification: Challenges and New Directions

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Fault injection attacks (FI / FIA)






Photo credit: Christian MOREL / CEA

Fault injection attacks, conceptually



Highly effective against cryptographic implementations
Can leverage software vulnerabilities [Cui & Rousley, 2017]



Processors security wrt. fault injection

FI can target many elements in complex SoCs

e.g. **memory hierarchy** [Trouchkine, 2021]

The attack setup around FI can be elaborated

e.g. **bypassing a secure boot**, on complex SoCs
[Vasselle, 2020] [Fanjias, 2023]

Fault effects are diverse and hard to understand

black-box characterization [Trouchkine, 2021]

characterization methodology [Proy, 2019]

Finding a needle in a haystack?

- Fault exploitation is expensive
- Characterization of fault effects is challenging
 - limited observability
 - effects depends on FI setup
- BUT lots of needles available
 - Large attack surface
 - Faults can induce many unexpected, exploitable effects



[Trouchkine, 2021] Electromagnetic fault injection against a complex CPU, toward new micro-architectural fault models [10.1007/s13389-021-00259-6](https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-021-00259-6)

[Fanjias, 2023] Exploration of system-on-chip secure-boot vulnerability to fault-injection by side-channel analysis [10.1007/978-3-031-25319-5_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25319-5_2)

[Vasselle, 2020] Laser-Induced Fault Injection on Smartphone Bypassing the Secure Boot-Extended Version [10.1109/TC.2018.2860010](https://doi.org/10.1109/TC.2018.2860010)

[Proy, 2019] A First ISA-Level Characterization of EM Pulse Effects on Superscalar Microarchitectures: A Secure Software Perspective [10.1145/3339252.3339253](https://doi.org/10.1145/3339252.3339253)

Fault injection attacks, behind the scenes



Fault injection attacks, behind the scenes

Different abstraction layers involved

- Circuit level: initial fault effect
- Software level: consequences of the lower-level fault effects


Turning attention to processor microarchitecture

- FI on processor pipelines can bypass SW protections [Yuce, 2016]
- Importance of hidden microarchitectural registers [Laurent, 2021]
- Microarchitectural fault effects are leveraged by specific SW conditions: init. state, run program [Tollec, 2022]

Fault effects depend on the current *system state*

- Faults can have no effect
- Faults can manifest after unknown amount of time
- Software system state = execution context

Joint HW-SW analysis is mandatory!



[Yuce, 2018]

[Laurent, 2021] Bridging the Gap between RTL and Software Fault Injection. [10.1145/3446214](https://doi.org/10.1145/3446214)

[Yuce, 2016] Software Fault Resistance is Futile: Effective Single-Glitch Attacks. [10.1109/FDTC.2016.21](https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2016.21)

[Tollec, 2022] Exploration of fault effects on formal RISC-V microarchitecture models. [10.1109/FDTC57191.2022.00017](https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC57191.2022.00017)

Security analysis

Security evaluation

- *In situ*: real system, real fault injection bench
 - E.g. certification
- Representative / accurate
 - of attacker capabilities
 - of system robustness
- Non-exhaustive

(out of the scope of this talk)

Security verification

- Model-based:
 - HW,
 - SW,
 - attacker
- Non-representative / accurate
 - of target system
 - of real fault effects
- Exhaustive

Security verification

Status

- Faults modeling incurs extra analysis complexity
 - State space explosion
 - Nb possible states
 - New transitions between reachable states
 - Multiple faults: combinatorial explosion
- Microarchitectural HW models + SW
 - Increase of models size

→ Simulation

- Efficient evaluation of model behaviour using *concrete* input state
- Can evaluate large models
- Exhaustivity is impractical: iterate \forall input states, \forall fault instances

Challenges

- Growing complexity of real case studies
 - Large HW designs, large programs (SW)
- Exhaustive verification wrt. model size explosion

→ Formal methods

- Designed to address exhaustivity
- Cannot address large models
 - Especially challenging wrt. FIA

Outline

- 1. Formal Modeling for Microarchitectural Fault Injections**
- 2. Protecting the Microarchitecture**
- 3. Benchmarking**





Formal Modeling for Microarchitectural Fault ■ Injections

S. Tollec, M. Asavoae, D. Couroussé, K. Heydemann, and M. Jan “ μ ArchiFI: Formal Modeling and Verification Strategies for Microarchitectural Fault Injections,” in *FMCAD*, 2023.

<https://zenodo.org/records/7958412>

<https://github.com/CEA-LIST/uArchiFI> *

* Currently empty, will be populated soon! 10

Modeling: faulty HW transition systems




Hardware modeling

Transition system $\mathcal{M} = (S, S_0, X, T)$ where

- A system state $s \in S$ corresponds to a valuation of circuit registers, i.e., $s := \langle r_1, \dots, r_n \rangle$.
- An input $x \in X$ is a vector $x := \langle i_1, \dots, i_m \rangle$.
- $S_0 \subseteq S$ is the set of initial states,
- $T: S \times X \rightarrow S$ is the transition function of the circuit.

Need for a tool that automatically:

- Parses hardware description languages
- Builds a hardware transition system



—Hardware


Modeling: faulty HW transition systems

Software program mapping

The program is encoded in the initial state of a memory modeled simultaneously with the processor, i.e., S_0 .

Requirements

- Initialize the initial state of the transition system
- Simulate the system up to the desired state



—Hardware
—Software

Modeling: faulty HW transition systems




Fault injection model

Fault model $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{E}$ where

- \mathcal{L} is the set of possible locations of the fault,
- \mathcal{T} is the timing range of the fault injection,
- \mathcal{E} is the set of possible effects of the fault.
E.g., bit-flip, byte-reset, symbolic value

Need for a tool that automatically:

- Modifies the transition system according to the fault model



Modeling: faulty HW transition systems


Attacker model

Attacker model $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{F}, \varphi, N)$ where

- \mathcal{F} is the fault model,
- φ is the *attacker goal* defined as a reachability property on the transition system,
- N is the maximum number of fault injections.


Need for a verification procedure that automatically:

- Finds whether the attacker goal is reachable
- Provides a counterexample to understand the propagation of the fault and its final consequences



μ ArchiFI implementation: system modeling

μ ArchiFI workflow



[FDTC, 2022]

- Highlights subtle fault effects in microarchitecture
- Analyses consequences in software




μ ArchiFI infrastructure (based on Yosys)

- Frontend: Hardware description languages, e.g., Verilog
- Yosys Intermediate Representation (RTLIL): Graph with gates and connections
- Takes an attacker model as input
- Formal backend: Aiger, SMV, Btor2, SMTLib

Transition system generation

- Bind the HW design and the binary program
- Simulate the system up to the desired state
- Include the attacker model

μArchiFI in practice: three use cases

Use case names		<i>I - Robust Software</i>	<i>II - Robust Hardware</i>	<i>III - Cryptographic Software</i>
Hardware design	name:	 CV32E40P (Riscy) - RISC-V - 4 stages	 Secure Ibex - RISC-V - 2 stages - dual core	 Ibex - RISC-V - 2 stages
	gates:	2842	4422	1983
	FFs:	179	211	114
	size*(GE):	89954	61452	26327
Software program	VerifyPIN_V7 [Dur+16]	VerifyPIN_V1 [Dur+16]	Key Schedule (AES) [kok19]	
Attacker Goal φ	Bypass authentication without triggering SW alert	Bypass authentication without triggering HW alert	Set to 0 a byte in the penultimate round key	
Fault model \mathcal{F}	location:	Sequential logic Control Path	Sequential logic Redundant CPU Core	Combinational logic Execute stage of CPU
	effect:	Symbolic	Symbolic	Reset
	timing:	60:*	*	*
Number of FIs N	1	5	2	
BMC depth k	75	46	38	
Verification results	φ is reachable	φ is unreachable	φ is unreachable (φ reachable with $N=4$)	

* when synthesized with the open-source Nangate45 standard cell library

← Limited HW size

← Limited SW size

← Bounded verification (~100 cycles)

Fault-Resistant Partitioning of Secure CPUs

CHES 2024
→ Thursday, September 5
→ Fault Resistance I







Figure 3: Co-verification methodology to evaluate SW/HW systems against faults attacks.




■ Protecting the Microarchitecture





T. Chamelot, D. Couroussé, and K. Heydemann “**MAFIA**: Protecting the Microarchitecture of Embedded Systems Against Fault Injection Attacks,” *IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems (TCAD)*, 2023.


Problem: Faults targeting control signals

-  Data integrity
-  Code authenticity / integrity
-  Control-flow integrity




Problem: Faults targeting control signals

-  Data integrity
-  Code authenticity / integrity
-  Control-flow integrity
-  **Control-signal integrity** [TCAD, 2023]








MAFIA: Protection of the microarchitecture against fault injection attacks

- 🛡️ Data integrity (not supported)
- 🛡️ Code authenticity / integrity
- 🛡️ Control-flow integrity
- 🛡️ **Control-signal integrity**



Code Authenticity and Control-Flow Integrity (CACFI)

-  Code authenticity / integrity ← signature function f
-  Control-flow integrity ← signature chaining
-  Control-signal integrity ← signature computed from **pipeline state** values




Control-Signal Integrity (CSI)


Control-signal integrity

- Integrity ensured by redundancy e.g. duplication
- Signals are verified at each stage (until consumption)

- Code authenticity / integrity
- Control-flow integrity
- Control-signal integrity




MAFIA: Software support



Experimental evaluation

Methodology

- ASIC synthesis. 22nm FDSOI @ 400MHz
- RTL simulation of Embench IoT
 - All the code is instrumented (signature continuity)
 - Verifications in each basic block of the benchmarked functions




Hardware evaluation

- Surface CV32E40P : 50kGE
- Surface CRC32 : 55kGE +6,5% (+5kGE)
- Surface Prince : 64kGE +23,8% (+13kGE)

Software evaluation CRC32

- Code size overhead: +29,4%
- Execution time overhead: +18,4%





■ Benchmarking

Benchmarking: supporting development of security and reproducible research

Objectives

- Validate / evaluate analysis tools: security analysis results, analysis computation time
- Replicate documented attacks & countermeasures

Needs

Provide representative implementations, of variable complexity

Analysis

- Target implementation: complete, detailed (E.g. netlist + binary program)
- Attacker model: faults, attack objectives...
- Complexity metrics

Development of countermeasures

- Source code
- Targeted security: properties, coverage of each protection

Pitfalls

Consider cryptography, but not only

Analysis

- Various abstraction levels possible:
 - SW: source code, compiler IR, binary code
 - HW: RTL, netlist (back-annotated?)
- The implementation model must match the fault/attacker model
- Sensitivity to the input state

Development of countermeasures

- Impact of compiler + synthesis flow

Benchmarking processor security

Open-sourcing secure implementations and analysis tools is not enough!

Objectives

- Validate / evaluate analysis tools: security analysis results, analysis computation time
- Replicate documented attacks & countermeasures

Development of representative benchmarks?

→ HW + SW countermeasures

• Target implementation

- binary code,
- RTL / netlist,
- Initial system state (program inputs, ...)
- Associated source code and documented toolchain.


• Attacker model

- Fault model
- Attacker capabilities: controlled / observable variables (eg.inputs), etc.
- Attacker objectives →
 - in SW: target program address + predicates on data
 - in HW: target state

- **Attack scenarios:** instances of attacker model allowing to reproduce a vulnerability (if relevant)

[FISSC: the Fault Injection and Simulation Secure Collection](#)
[Dureuil, 2016]

- SW benchmarks targeting FI
- Collection of C programs w/ multiple variants of source-level hardening
- Fault model: branch inversion
- Two attacker models



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