

Emmanuelle Anceaume, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni

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- 2 Emmanuelle Anceaume @ H ORCID
- <sup>3</sup> CNRS, Inria, Université Rennes, IRISA, Campus de beaulieu, 35042 Rennes, France
- 4 Antonella Del Pozzo @
- 5 Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List, F-91120, Palaiseau, France
- 6 Thibault Rieutord @
- 7 Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List, F-91120, Palaiseau, France

#### <sup>8</sup> Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni <sup>0</sup>

9 Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List, F-91120, Palaiseau, France

#### <sup>10</sup> — Abstract -

This paper focuses on blockchain finality, which refers to the time when it becomes impossible to remove a block that has previously been appended to the blockchain. Blockchain finality can be deterministic or probabilistic, immediate or eventual. To favor availability against consistency in the face of partitions, most blockchains only offer probabilistic eventual finality: blocks may be revoked after being appended to the blockchain, yet with decreasing probability as they sink deeper into the chain. Other blockchains favor consistency by leveraging the immediate finality of Consensus – a block appended is never revoked – at the cost of additional synchronization.

The quest for "good" deterministic finality properties for blockchains is still in its infancy, though. 18 Our motivation is to provide a thorough study of several possible deterministic finality properties and 19 explore their solvability. This is achieved by introducing the notion of bounded revocation, which 20 informally says that the number of blocks that can be revoked from the current blockchain is bounded. 21 Based on the requirements we impose on this revocation number, we provide reductions between 22 different forms of eventual finality, Consensus and Eventual Consensus. From these reductions, we 23 show some related impossibility results in presence of Byzantine processes, and provide non-trivial 24 25 results. In particular, we provide an algorithm that solves a weak form of eventual finality in an asynchronous system in presence of an unbounded number of Byzantine processes. We also provide 26 an algorithm that solves eventual finality with a bounded revocation number in an eventually 27 synchronous environment in presence of less than half of Byzantine processes. The simplicity of the 28 arguments should better guide blockchain designs and link them to clear formal properties of finality. 29

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### <sup>32</sup> **1** Introduction

This paper focuses on blockchain finality, which refers to the time when it becomes impossible to remove a block previously appended to the blockchain. Blockchain finality can be deterministic or probabilistic, immediate or eventual.

Informally, immediate finality guarantees, as its name suggests, that when a block is 36 appended to a local copy, it is immediately finalized and thus will never be revoked in the 37 future. Designing blockchains with immediate finality favors consistency against availability 38 in presence of transient partitions of the system. It leverages the properties of Consensus (i.e. 39 a decision value is unique and agreed by everyone), at the cost of synchronization constraints. 40 Assuming partially synchronous environments, most of the permissioned blockchains satisfy 41 the deterministic form of immediate consistency, as for example Red Belly blockchain [8] and 42 Hyperledger Fabric blockchain [2]. The probabilistic form of immediate finality is typically 43 achieved by permissionless pure proof-of-stake blockchains such as Algorand [7]. 44 Unlike immediate finality, eventual finality only ensures that eventually all local copies of 45

the blockchain share a common increasing prefix, and thus finality of their blocks increases

as more blocks are appended to the blockchain. The majority of cryptoassets blockchains, 47 with Bitcoin [20] and Ethereum [25] as celebrated examples, guarantee eventual finality 48 with some probability: blocks may be revoked after being appended to the blockchain, yet 49 with decreasing probability as they sink deeper into the chain. In an effort to replace the 50 energy-wasting pow method of Bitcoin and Ethereum, recent proof-of-stake blockchains such 51 as e.g. [16, 12, 15] emerged. These blockchains offer as well a form of eventual finality. More 52 broadly, all these permission-less solutions favor availability (or progress) only relying on a 53 broadcast primitive to diffuse blocks and a local reconciliation mechanism to select a unique 54 chain. It is indeed admitted that a blockchain may lose consistency by incurring a fork, 55 which is the presence of multiple chains at different processes. The reconciliation mechanism, 56 available to recover from a fork, consists in a local deterministic rule selecting a chain among 57 the different possible alternatives. In Bitcoin for instance any participant reconciles the state 58 following the "longest" chain rule (the term "longest" chain rule is commonly employed, but 59 this is actually the one that required the most work to be built). Once a winner chain is 60 chosen, the other alternatives are revoked, as such all the blocks belonging to them. In these 61 designs, however, network effects make the moment at which all honest processes observe the 62 same set of candidate chains unknown. Reconciliation and finalisation guarantees are then 63 unsure, or simply extremely inefficient, for example by considering a block as finalised after 64 one or more days. To solve this problem a number of permissionless blockchain projects are 65 investigating how to add "finality gadgets" (e.g., [5, 24]) to proof-of-work or proof-of-stake 66 blockchains, which means seeking additional mechanisms or protocols to reach "better" finality 67 properties in network adversarial settings. The hope is to find ways to get deterministic 68 finality by periodically running finality gadgets. For the time being, the only way that has 69 been concretely pursued is to resort to Byzantine Consensus – e.g. Tenderbake [4] adds 70 Byzantine Consensus to the existing proof-of-stake method assuring deterministic finality 71 to each block followed by other two blocks. How to add mechanisms that do not resort to 72 Consensus, however, is an intriguing and open question, related to the finality properties one 73 would like to guarantee. 74

The quest for "good" deterministic finality properties for blockchains is still in its infancy, 75 though. Our motivation is to provide a protocol-independent abstraction of several possible 76 finality properties to study their solvability. To this aim we formalise, for the first time, the 77 notion of finality in a protocol-agnostic way. At the heart of the proposed formalisation lies 78 the notion of *bounded revocation*. Bounded revocation informally says that the number of 79 blocks that can be revoked from the current blockchain is bounded. Providing solutions 80 that guarantee deterministic bounded revocation reveals to be an important crux in the 81 construction of blockchains. We thus provide rigorous definitions for the weakest form of 82 eventual finality  $\mathcal{EF}^*$ , which does not guarantee any bound on the number of blocks that 83 can be revoked from the blockchain at any given fork, and two stronger forms:  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ , in 84 which revocation is bounded but unknown, and  $\mathcal{EF}^c$ , in which revocation is bounded and 85 known. Intuitively, if  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  holds, processes revoke at most a constant number c of blocks 86 from the current blockchain at each reconciliation, while if  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  holds, processes revoke 87 at most a constant number of c blocks from the current chain only eventually, i.e., after a 88 finite but unknown number of reconciliations. The rigorous formalisation of these properties 89 enable us to easily show that solutions that guarantee  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  are equivalent to Consensus, 90 while solutions that guarantee  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  are not weaker than Eventual Consensus, an abstraction 91 that captures eventual agreement among all participants. From these reductions, we show 92 some related impossibility results in presence of Byzantine processes. Beside reductions and 93 related impossibilities, we propose the following non-trivial results: 94

 ${}^{95}$  =  $\mathcal{EF}^*$  cannot be achieved in an asynchronous system if the reconciliation rule follows the "longest" chain rule (Theorem 13). This implies that the reconciliation rule, used in current blockchains to provide probabilistic finality in synchronous settings, cannot guarantee that participants will eventually converge to a stable prefix of the chain in asynchronous settings.

A solution that guarantees  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  in an asynchronous system with a possibly infinite set of processes which can append infinitely many blocks. This novel solution is strikingly simple and tolerant to an unbounded number of Byzantine processes (Theorem 14).

A solution that solves  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  in an eventually synchronous environment in presence of less than half of Byzantine processes (Theorem 15). The central point of our solution is to let correct processes blame each fork on a particular Byzantine process, which can then be excluded from the computation. Weakening the classic requirement of < 1/3 to < 1/2Byzantine processes makes such a solution well adapted to large scale adversarial systems. As for the previous one, we are not aware of any such solution in the literature.

We hope that these results will better guide blockchain designs and link them to clear 109 formal properties of finality. Hence, in the remainder of this article, Section 2 situates our 110 work with respect to similar ones. Section 3 formally presents the sequential specification of 111 a blockchain and the formalisation of the different finality properties we may expect from 112 a blockchain when concurrently accessed. Section 4 presents reductions between different 113 forms of finality, Consensus and Eventual Consensus. Section 5 first shows why  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  is not 114 solvable in an asynchronous environment when the "heaviest" chain rule is used, and then 115 presents two original and surprisingly simple algorithms that respectively solve  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  and 116  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ . Finally, Section 6 concludes. 117

## 118 2 Related Work

Formalization of blockchains in the lens of distributed computing has been recognized as an 119 extremely important topic [14]. Garay et al. [10] have been the first to analyze the Bitcoin 120 backbone protocol and to define invariants this protocol has to satisfy to verify with high 121 probability an eventual consistent prefix, i.e. probabilistic eventual finality. The authors 122 have analyzed the protocol in a synchronous system, while others, as for example Pass et 123 al. [21], have extended this line of work considering a more adversarial network. In those 124 works the specification of the consistency properties are protocol dependent and thus provide 125 an abstraction level that does not allow us to model the blockchain as a shared object being 126 agnostic of the way it is implemented. The objective we pursue throughout this work is to 127 formalize the semantic of the interface between the blockchain and the users. To do so we 128 consider the blockchain as a shared object, and thus the consistency properties are specified 129 independently of the synchrony assumptions of underlying distributed system and the type of 130 failures that may occur. By doing this, we offer a higher level of abstraction than well-known 131 properties do. 132

This approach has been recently followed in particular by Anta et al. [3], Anceaume et al. [1] and Guerraoui et al. [13]<sup>1</sup>. In Anta et al. [3], the authors propose a formalization of distributed ledgers, modeled as an ordered list of records along with implementations for sequential consistency and linearizability using a total order broadcast abstraction. Anceaume

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> While not related to the blockchain data structure, authors of [13] have formalized the notion of cryptocurrency showing that Consensus is not needed.

et al. [1] have captured the convergence process of two distinct classes of blockchain systems: 137 the class providing strong prefix as [3] (for each pair of chains returned at two different 138 processes, one is the prefix of the other) and the class providing eventual prefix, in which 139 multiple chains can co-exist but the common prefix eventually converges. The authors of [1] 140 show that to solve strong prefix the Consensus abstraction is needed, however they do not 141 address solvability of eventual prefix and do not formalise finality. Interestingly, our notion 142 of finality and bounded revocation is able to encompass the strong and the eventual prefix 143 consistency properties of [1]. 144

#### 145 **3** Definitions

#### <sup>146</sup> 3.1 Preliminary Definitions

We describe a blockchain object as an abstract data type which allows us to completely characterize a blockchain by the operations it exports [18]. The basic idea underlying the use of abstract data types is to specify shared objects using two complementary facets: a sequential specification that describes the semantics of the object, and a consistency criterion over concurrent histories, i.e. the set of admissible executions in a concurrent environment [22]. Prior to presenting the blockchain abstract data type we first recall the formalization used to describe an abstract data type (ADT).

#### <sup>154</sup> 3.1.1 Abstract data types.

An abstract data type (ADT) is a tuple of the form  $T = (A, B, Z, z_0, \tau, \delta)$ . Here A and B 155 are countable sets respectively called *input alphabet* and *output alphabet*. Z is a countable 156 set of abstract object states and  $z_0 \in Z$  is the initial abstract state. The map  $\tau: Z \times A \to Z$ 157 is the *transition function*, specifying the effect of an input on the object state and the 158 map  $\delta: Z \times A \to B$  is the *output function*, specifying the output returned for a given input 159 and an object local state. An input represents an operation with its parameters, where (i)160 the operation can have a side-effect that changes the abstract state according to transition 161 function  $\tau$  and (ii) the operation can return values taken in the output B, which depends on 162 the state in which it is called and the output function  $\delta$ . 163

#### **3.1.2** Concurrent histories of an ADT

<sup>165</sup> Concurrent histories are defined considering asymmetric event structures, i.e., partial order
 <sup>166</sup> relations among events executed by different processes.

**Definition 1.** (Concurrent history H) The execution of a program that uses an abstract data type  $T = \langle A, B, Z, \xi_0, \tau, \delta \rangle$  defines a concurrent history  $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \nearrow \rangle$ , where  $\Sigma = A \cup (A \times B)$  is a countable set of operations;

- E is a countable set of events that contains all the ADT operations invocations and all ADT operation response events;
- 172  $\Lambda: E \to \Sigma$  is a function which associates events to the operations in  $\Sigma$ ;
- 173  $\mapsto$ : is the process order, irreflexive order over the events of E. Two events  $(e, e') \in E^2$ 174 are ordered by  $\mapsto$  if they are produced by the same process,  $e \neq e'$  and e happens before e', 175 that is denoted as  $e \mapsto e'$ .
- $\neg : is the operation order, irreflexive order over the events of E. For each couple$  $(e, e') \in E^2 if e' is the invocation of an operation occurred at time t' and e is the response$ of another operation occurred at time t with <math>t < t' then  $e \prec e'$ ;

 $\nearrow$ : is the program order, irreflexive order over E, for each couple  $(e, e') \in E^2$  with  $e \neq e'$ 179 if  $e \mapsto e'$  or  $e \prec e'$  then  $e \nearrow e'$ . 180

#### 3.2 The blocktree ADT 181

We represent a blockchain as a tree of blocks. The same representation has been adopted 182 in [1]. Indeed, while consensus-based blockchains prevent forks or branching in the tree of 183 blocks, blockchain systems based on proof-of-work allow the occurrence of forks to happen 184 hence presenting blocks under a tree structure. The blockchain object is thus defined as a 185 blocktree abstract data type (Blocktree ADT). 186

#### 3.2.1 Sequential Specification of the Blocktree ADT (BT-ADT) 187

A blocktree data structure is a directed rooted tree  $bt = (V_{bt}, E_{bt})$  where  $V_{bt}$  represents a 188 set of blocks and  $E_{bt}$  a set of edges such that each block has a single path towards the root 189 of the tree  $b_0$  called the genesis block. A branching in the tree is called a *fork*. Let  $\mathcal{BT}$  be 190 the set of blocktrees,  $\mathcal{B}$  be the countable and non empty set of uniquely identified blocks 191 and let  $\mathcal{BC}$  be the countable non empty set of blockchains, where a blockchain is a path 192 from a leaf of bt to  $b_0$ . A blockchain is denoted by bc. The structure is equipped with two 193 operations append() and read(). Operation append(b) adds block  $b \notin bt$  to  $V_{bt}$  and adds the 194 edge (b, b') to  $E_{bt}$  where  $b' \in V_{bt}$  is returned by the append selection function  $f_a()$  applied to 195 bt. Operation read() returns the chain bc selected by the read selection function  $f_r()$  applied 196 to bt (note that in [1], the read() and append() operations are defined with a unique selection 197 function). The read selection  $f_r()$  takes as argument the blocktree and returns a chain of 198 blocks, that is a sequence of blocks starting from the genesis block to a leaf block of the 199 blocktree. The chain bc returned by a read() operation r is called the blockchain, and is 200 denoted by r/bc. The append selection function  $f_a()$  takes as argument the blocktree and 201 returns a chain of blocks. Function *last block()* takes as argument a chain of blocks and 202 returns the last appended block of the chain. Only blocks satisfying some validity predicate 203 P can be appended to the tree. Predicate P is an application-dependent predicate used to 204 verify the validity of the chain obtained by appending the new block b to the chain returned 205 by  $f_a()$  (denoted by  $f_a(bt) \frown b$ ). In Bitcoin for instance this predicate embeds the logic to 206 verify that the obtained chain does not contain double spending or overspending transactions. 207 Formally, 208

▶ Definition 2. (Sequential specification of the Blocktree ADT) The Blocktree Abstract Data 209 Type is the 6-tuple BT – ADT={ $A = \{append(b), read()/bc \in \mathcal{BC}\}, B = \mathcal{BC} \cup \{\top, \bot\}, Z =$ 210  $\mathcal{BT}, \xi_0 = b_0, \tau, \delta$ , where the transition function  $\tau : Z \times A \to Z$  is defined by 211

$$\tau(bt, read()) = bt$$

2

$$\tau(bt, append(b)) = \begin{cases} (V_{bt} \cup \{b\}, E_{bt} \cup \{b, last\_block(f_a(bt))\}) \text{ if } P(f_a(bt)^{\frown}b) \\ bt \text{ otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and where the output function  $\delta: Z \times A \to B$  is defined by 215

 $\delta(bt, read()) = f_r(bt)$ 216

$$\delta(bt, append(b)) = \begin{cases} \top \text{ if } P(f_a(bt) \frown b) \\ \bot \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Note that we do not need to add the validity check during the read operation in the 219 sequential specification of the Blocktree ADT because in absence of concurrency the validity 220 check during the append operation is enough. 221

# 3.2.2 3.2.2 Concurrent Specification and Consistency Criteria of the BlockTree ADT

The concurrent specification of the blocktree abstract data type is the set of its concurrent histories. A blocktree consistency criterion is a function that returns the set of concurrent histories admissible for the blocktree abstract data type. In this paper, we define three consistency criteria for the blocktree, i.e. the *BT eventual finality (EF)*, the *BT immediate finality* (*IF*) and *BT eventual immediate finality (EIF)*, and the notion of block revocation. This family of consistency criteria combined with the revocation notion provides a comprehensive characterization of what we may expect from blockchains.

#### ▶ Notation 1.

- $E(a^*, r^*)$  is an infinite set containing an infinite number of append() and read() invocation and response events;
- $E(a, r^*)$  is an infinite set containing (i) a finite number of append() invocation and response events and (ii) an infinite number of read() invocation and response events;
- $_{236}$  =  $o_{inv}$  and  $o_{rsp}$  indicate respectively the invocation and response event of an operation o;
- and in particular for the read() operation,  $r_{rsp}/bc$  denotes the returned blockchain bc associated with the response event  $r_{rsp}$  and for the append() operation  $a_{inv}(b)$  denotes the invocation of the append operation having b as input parameter;
- equation length:  $\mathcal{BC} \to \mathbb{N}$  denotes a monotonic increasing deterministic function that takes as input a blockchain bc and returns a natural number as length of bc. Increasing monotonicity means that length(bc^{bc};
- We represent chain bc as an infinite list  $b_0b^*\perp^+$  of blocks, where the first block  $bc[0] = b_0$ , the genesis block, followed by block values b, and an infinite number of  $\perp$  values. Notation bc[i] refers to the *i*-th block of blockchain bc. Note that the special " $\perp$ " symbol counts for zero for the length function.
- $_{247}$  **b**  $c \sqsubseteq bc'$  if and only if bc prefixes bc'. The operator  $\sqsubseteq$  ignores all the records set to  $\bot$ .

<sup>248</sup> ► **Definition 3** (BT Eventual Finality Consistency criterion (EF)). A concurrent history <sup>249</sup>  $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \nearrow \rangle$  of a system that uses a BT-ADT verifies the BT eventual finality <sup>250</sup> consistency criterion if the following four properties hold:

<sup>251</sup> Chain validity:

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- $\forall r_{rsp} \in E, P(r_{rsp}/bc).$
- 253 Each returned chain is valid.
- **254** Chain integrity:
- 255  $\forall r_{rsp} \in E, \forall b \in r_{rsp}/bc : b \neq b_0, \exists a_{inv}(b) \in E, a_{inv}(b) \nearrow r_{rsp}.$
- If a block different from the genesis block is returned, then an append operation has been invoked with this block as parameter. This property is to avoid the situation in which
- reads *return blocks never* appended.

#### **Eventual prefix:**

- $\forall E \in E(a, r^*) \cup E(a^*, r^*), \forall r_{rsp}/bc, \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : bc[i] \neq \bot, \exists r'_{rsp}, \forall r''_{rsp} : r'_{rsp} \nearrow r''_{rsp}, \\ ((r'_{rsp}/bc')[i] = (r''_{rsp}/bc'')[i]).$
- In all the histories in which the number of read invocations is infinite, then for any non empty read chain at position i, there exists a read r'/bc' from which all the subsequent
- reads r''/bc'' will return the same block at position *i*, *i.e.* bc'[i] = bc''[i].
- <sup>265</sup> **Ever growing tree:**
- 266  $\forall E \in E(a^*, r^*), \forall k \in \mathbb{N}, \exists r \in E : \mathsf{length}(r_{rsp}/bc) > k.$
- In all the histories in which the number of append and read invocations is infinite, for each length k, there exists a read that returns a chain with length areater than k. This
- each length k, there exists a read that returns a chain with length greater than k. This

property avoids the trivial scenario in which the length of the chain remains unchanged 269 despite the occurrence of an infinite number of append operations (i.e., tree built as a star 270 with infinite branches of bounded length). Specifically the "Ever growing tree" property 271 imposes that in presence of an infinite number of read and append operations, for any 272 natural number i, there will always exist a read operation that will return a chain of at 273 least length i. Note that the well known "Chain Growth Property" [10, 21] states that 274 each (honest) chain grows proportionally with the number of rounds of the protocol, which 275 in contrast to our specification, makes it protocol dependent. 276

▶ Definition 4 (BT Immediate Finality Consistency criterion (IF)). A concurrent history  $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \nearrow \rangle$  of the system that uses a BT-ADT verifies the BT immediate finality consistency criterion if chain validity, chain integrity, ever growing tree (as defined for EF) and the following property hold:

281 Strong prefix:  $\forall E \in E(a, r^*) \cup E(a^*, r^*), \forall r_{rsp}/bc, r'_{rsp}/bc', \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : bc[i] \neq \bot$ , 282 if  $r_{rsp} \mapsto r'_{rsp}$  then  $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \bot$ 283 otherwise

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\* either  $bc'[i] \neq \bot$  and  $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \bot$ 

\* or  $bc'[i] = \bot$  and  $|\{r''/bc'' : bc''[i] = \bot\}| < \infty$ 

In all the histories in which the number of read invocations is infinite, and for any couple of read operations r and r' that return respectively bc and bc', such that for any position i in bc, bc[i] contains a value then, if both r and r' occur at the same process p and r occurs before r', then bc is a prefix of bc'. Otherwise (r and r' do not occur on the same process) either bc' contains the same value as the one contained in bc or contains  $\perp$ . In that case, the overall number of read operations that return  $\perp$  at position i is finite.

▶ Definition 5 (BT Eventual Immediate Finality Consistency criterion (EIF)). A concurrent history  $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \nearrow \rangle$  of the system that uses a BT-ADT verifies the BT eventual immediate finality consistency criterion if chain validity, chain integrity, ever growing tree (as defined for EF) and the following property hold:

<sup>296</sup> **Eventual Strong prefix:**  $\forall E \in E(a, r^*) \cup E(a^*, r^*), \exists \ell \in \mathbb{N}, \forall r_{rsp}/bc, r'_{rsp}/bc', \forall i \geq \ell \in \mathbb{N} : bc[i] \neq \bot,$ 

if  $r_{rsp} \mapsto r'_{rsp}$  then  $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \bot$ 

299 otherwise

\* either  $bc'[i] \neq \bot$  and  $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \bot$ 

301 \* or  $bc'[i] = \bot$  and  $|\{r''/bc'' : bc''[i] = \bot\}| < \infty$ 

There exists a natural number  $\ell$ , such that once the length of the chain is equal to  $\ell$ , then the strong prefix property holds. Notice that, when the length of the chain is smaller than  $\ell$  then values it contains may change from one read to another.

#### **Bounded revocation**

Informally, bounded revocation says that for any two reads r/bc and r'/bc' such that rprecedes r', then by pruning the last c blocks from bc the obtained chain is a prefix of bc'. Note that constant c can be initially known or not.

**Definition 6** (*c*-Bounded Revocation).

 $\exists c \in \mathbb{N}, \forall r_{rsp}, r'_{rsp} \in E : r_{rsp} \nearrow r'_{rsp}, \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : i \leq (\mathsf{length}(r_{rsp}/bc) - c) \text{ then } (r_{rsp}/bc)[i] = (r'_{rsp}/bc')[i].$ 

<sup>312</sup> Note that the *c*-Bounded Revocation is not protocol dependent in contrast to the well-known <sup>313</sup> "Common-Prefix Property" [10, 21], which states that for any two rounds r and r' of the <sup>314</sup> protocol with r < r', the (honest) chain read at round r from which the last c blocks have <sup>315</sup> been pruned is a prefix of (resp. is equal to with high probability) the one read at round r'.

Notation 2. For readability reasons, in the following we will simply say *finality* instead of
 *finality consistency criterion*, i.e., eventual finality consistency criterion will be replaced by
 eventual finality, and (eventual) immediate finality consistency criterion will be replaced by
 (eventual) immediate finality.

We can now define the c-Bounded Eventual Finality criteria by augmenting the previous consistency criteria with the Bounded revocation property:

**Definition 7.** *c*−*Bounded Eventual Finality criteria* 

 $\mathcal{EF}^{\star} = EF$ , in this case the revocation is unbounded.

 $\mathcal{EF}^c = EIF$  combined with c-Bounded revocation, such that c is known a priori.

 $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c} = EIF$  combined with c-Bounded revocation where c is unknown but bounded.

### **4** (Eventual) Consensus Reductions

<sup>327</sup> In this section we investigate the impact of the bounded revocation property on the construc-<sup>328</sup> tion of a blocktree satisfying eventual finality. In particular, we show that when the bound c<sup>329</sup> is known, this problem is equivalent to the Consensus abstraction, while when unknown, this <sup>330</sup> problem is not weaker than the Eventual Consensus abstraction [9].

#### **4.1** Known Bounded Revocation and Consensus

**Theorem 8.**  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  is equivalent to Consensus.

**Proof.** We first show how to solve immediate finality (IF) given a solution  $\mathcal{P}$  for  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  and then 333 the reciprocal direction. Indeed, the equivalence between immediate finality and Consensus 334 is known from [1]. So let us show that we can solve immediate finality using  $\mathcal{P}$ . To do so, we 335 consider the following transformation from the protocol  $\mathcal{P}$ . To make an append() operation, 336 processes simply use the append() operation provided by  $\mathcal{P}$ . But, for the read() operation, 337 processes use the read() operation provided by  $\mathcal{P}$  to obtain a chain and prune the last c 338 blocks from it before returning the remaining chain. Note that if there are less than c blocks, 339 processes then return the genesis block. 340

Let us show that this modified protocol solves immediate finality. For this, we need to show that the following properties are satisfied:

<sup>343</sup> **Chain validity:** The chain validity property is still satisfied by pruning the last c blocks.

<sup>344</sup> **Chain integrity:** The chain integrity property is still satisfied by pruning the last c<sup>345</sup> blocks.

<sup>346</sup> **Strong prefix:** The strong prefix property follows from the known bounded revocation <sup>347</sup> property and the removal of the last c blocks. Indeed, if we remove the last c blocks, then

for any two read() operations, then the first read() returns a prefix of the second read() operation.

**Ever growing tree:** The ever growing tree property is still satisfied by pruning the last c blocks.

For the other direction, we can build a solution to  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  using a solution for immediate finality. This trivially solves  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  with c = 0.

**Corollary 9.** There does not exist any solution that solves  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  in an eventual synchronous system with more than n/3 Byzantine processes, where n is the number of processes participating to the algorithm.

<sup>357</sup> **Proof.** The proof follows from the equivalence between  $\mathcal{EF}^c$  and Consensus (cf. Theorem 8), <sup>358</sup> which is unsolvable in a synchronous (and thus also in an eventually synchronous) system <sup>359</sup> with more than one third of Byzantine processes [17].

#### **4.2** Unknown Bounded Revocation and Eventual Consensus

In this section we show that  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  is not weaker than Eventual Consensus. We first show its equivalence with eventual immediate finality (EIF). Later we recall the Eventual Consensus problem with a small modification of the validity property to make it suitable to the blockchain context and show that EIF is not weaker than Eventual Consensus.

**Theorem 10.**  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  is equivalent to eventual immediate finality.

Proof. Let  $\mathcal{P}_1$  be a protocol solving  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ , then by definition of  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ ,  $\mathcal{P}_1$  trivially solves eventual immediate finality.

For the other direction, let us consider a protocol  $\mathcal{P}_2$  solving eventual immediate finality 368 and let us show that it solves  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ . Eventual strong prefix property clearly implies the 369 eventual prefix property. Let  $revocation(b_1, b_2)$  be the function that takes two blockchains  $b_1$ 370 and  $b_2$  and returns the number of blocks needed to prune  $b_1$  in order to obtain a chain  $b'_1$  such 371 that  $b'_1 \sqsubseteq b_2$ . Let us show that  $\exists c \in \mathbb{N}, \forall r_{rsp}, r'_{rsp} \in E^2, r \nearrow r'$ , revocation $(r_{rsp}/bc, r'_{rsp}/bc) < c_1 < c_2 < c$ 372 c. Assume by contradiction that this inequality is not satisfied. This implies that for any 373 c, there exists a couple of reads with a greater revocation than c, and thus the eventual 374 strong prefix property does not hold. A contradiction with the assumption. Hence eventual 375 immediate finality implies  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ . Putting all together, we have shown that eventual immediate 376 finality is equivalent to  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ . 377

The Eventual Consensus (EC) abstraction [9] captures eventual agreement among all participants. It exports, to every process  $p_i$ , operations proposeEC<sub>1</sub>, proposeEC<sub>2</sub>,... that take multi-valued arguments (correct processes propose valid values) and return multi-valued responses. Assuming that, for all  $j \in \mathbb{N}$ , every process invokes proposeEC<sub>j</sub> as soon as it returns a response to proposeEC<sub>j-1</sub>, the abstraction guarantees that, in every admissible run, there exists  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and a predicate  $P_{EC}$ , such that the following properties are satisfied:

**EC-Termination.** Every correct process eventually returns a response to  $proposeEC_j$ for all  $j \in \mathbb{N}$ .

**EC-Integrity.** No process responds twice to  $proposeEC_i$  for all  $j \in \mathbb{N}$ .

 $\mathbf{EC}$ -Validity. Every value returned to proposeEC<sub>i</sub> is valid with respect to predicate  $P_{EC}$ .

**EC-Agreement.** No two correct processes return different values to  $proposeEC_j$  for all  $j \ge k$ .

#### **590 • Theorem 11.** Eventual immediate finality is not weaker than Eventual Consensus.

Proof. We show that there exists a protocol  $\mathcal{P}_1$  that solves Eventual Consensus assuming the existence of a protocol  $\mathcal{P}_2$  that solves eventual immediate finality. We do the transformation as follows. Every correct process p invokes proposeEC<sub>j</sub> for all  $j \in \mathbb{N}$ . We impose that the validity predicate P of the blocktree ADT (see Section 3) be equal to predicate  $P_{EC}$ . When a correct process p invokes the proposeEC<sub>j</sub>(v) operation of  $\mathcal{P}_1$ , for any  $j \in \mathbb{N}$ , then p executes the following sequence of three steps: (i) p invokes the append(v) operation of  $\mathcal{P}_2$ , then (ii) p

- <sup>397</sup> invokes a sequence of read() operations up to the moment the read() returns a chain bc such <sup>398</sup> that  $bc[j] \neq \bot$ , and finally *(iii)* p decides chain bc (i.e., it returns chain bc) and triggers the <sup>399</sup> next operation proposeEC<sub>i+1</sub>(v'). We now show that protocol  $\mathcal{P}_1$  solves Eventual Consensus.
- **EC-Termination** This property is guaranteed by the ever growing tree property.
- 401 **EC-Integrity** This property follows directly from the transformation.
- EC-Validity This property follows by construction and by the chain validity property since predicate P equals to predicate  $P_{EC}$ .
- 404 **EC-Agreement** This property follows by the eventual strong prefix property, which

 $_{405}$  guarantees that there exists a read() operation r such that all the subsequent ones return

- <sup>406</sup> blockchains that are each prefix of the following one. In other words, eventually there is
- agreement on the value contained in bc[j]. This implies that there exists k for which all
- <sup>408</sup> proposeEC<sub>j</sub> with  $j \ge k$  return the same value to all correct processes.
- 409

▶ **Theorem 12.** There does not exist any solution that solves  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  in an asynchronous system with at least one Byzantine process.

<sup>412</sup> **Proof.** The proof follows from the relationship between the  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  and eventual immediate fi-<sup>413</sup> nality (EIF). EIF is not weaker than the Eventual Consensus problem (cf. Theorem 11), which <sup>414</sup> is equivalent to the leader election problem [9], which cannot be solved in an asynchronous <sup>415</sup> system with at least one Byzantine process [23].

#### 416 **5** Eventual Finality Solutions

<sup>417</sup> In this section we first show the impossibility of solving  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  when the **append** operation, in <sup>418</sup> case of forks, selects the "longest" chain. We then provide the first solution to  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  with an <sup>419</sup> unbounded number of Byzantine processes using an alternative selection rule.

#### 420 5.1 Impossibility of Eventual Finality with the Longest Chain Rule

In the following we prove that, in an asynchronous environment, we cannot provide  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  if, 421 in case of forks, the append selection function  $f_a()$  follows the longest chain rule, i.e., returns 422 the longest chain of the blockchain tree. Obviously we assume that blocks are not created 423 using the Consensus abstraction: With Consensus, immediate finality is easily ensured, and 424 thus no fork will ever occur. Thus, when the Consensus abstraction cannot be implemented 425 (d to the adversity of the environment), many blockchain systems adopt a selection function 426  $f_a$  based on the longest chain. For instance, in proof-of-work systems such as Bitcoin, selected 427 chains are the ones that have required the most amount of work, which is equivalent to the 428 longest chains when the difficulty is constant. In Ethereum, while the selection rule is based 429 on heaviest sub-tree of the blockchain tree, or in proof-of-stake systems like EOS [12] or 430 Tezos [11], the same argument applies. 431

To show this impossibility result, we consider a scenario in which the occurrence of any fork produces at most two alternative chains (this is often referred to as a branching factor of 2). We consider a finite number of processes and an append selection function  $f_a$  that in case of forks deterministically selects the longest chain through the length function (see Section 3.2.2), and in case of a tie selects the chain following any deterministic rule (for instance the chain whose last block hast the smallest digest). We show that it is impossible to guarantee  $\mathcal{EF}^*$  for such append selection function  $f_a$ .

Intuitively, the impossibility follows from the fact that with the longest chain selection rule, races can occur between different branches in the tree. We show that as forks may

occur, we can create two infinite branches sharing only the root. One or the other branch
constitutes alternatively the longest chain and append operations select chains from each
branch alternatively. This is enough to show that the only common prefix that is returned is
the root hence, violating eventual finality.

To capture the synchronisation power of the system, we abstract the deterministic creation 445 of new blocks and their addition to the blockchain within an oracle. This oracle is the only 446 generator of valid blocks, and regulates the number of appended children from a same 447 parent. The same approach has been proposed in [1]. The branching factor of an oracle 448 is the maximal number of children that can be appended to a block. The oracle owns a 449 synchronization power equal to Consensus if its branching factor is equal to 1. The oracle 450 grants access to the blocktree as a shared object, through the following three operations: 451 update\_view() returns the current state of the blocktree; getValidBlock $(b_i, b_j)$  returns a valid 452 block  $b'_i$ , constructed from  $b_i$ , that can be appended to block  $b_i$ , where  $b_i$  is already included 453 in the blocktree; and setValidBlock $(b_i, b'_i)$  appends the valid block  $b'_i$  to  $b_i$ , and returns  $\top$ 454 when the block is successfully appended and  $\perp$  otherwise. The following theorem shows that, 455 even with this strong oracle (that allows to have a bounded branching factor in contrast to 456 PoW approaches), we cannot reach eventual finality if we rely on the longest chain rule to 457 resolve forks. 458

▶ **Theorem 13.** It is impossible to guarantee  $\mathcal{EF}^*$  if the append operation is based on the longest chain rule in an asynchronous environment.

<sup>461</sup> **Proof.** The interested reader is invited to read the proof in the Appendix of this paper.

### 462 5.2 Asynchronous Solution to $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$ with an Unbounded Number of 463 Byzantine Processes

We consider an asynchronous system with a possibly infinite set of processes which can 464 append infinitely many blocks, and processes can be affected by Byzantine failures. Each 465 process has a unique identifier  $i \in \mathbb{N}$  and is equipped with signatures that can be used to 466 identify the message sender identifier. Each block is identified with the identifier of the 467 process that created it. Block identifier is inserted in the header of the block. Moreover, since 468 it has been proven that reliable communications are necessary to ensure eventual finality [1], 469 we assume that each process is equipped with an Eventually Reliable Broadcast primitive 470 that satisfies the following two properties: If a correct process p broadcasts a message m471 then p eventually delivers m and if a correct process p delivers m then all correct processes 472 eventually deliver m. Such a primitive can be implemented by organizing the infinite set 473 of processes in a topology in which for each pair of correct processes, there exists a path 474 composed by only correct processes [19]. Thus, we do not require any assumptions on the 475 proportion between Byzantine and correct processes in the system but on the way those 476 processes are arranged on the network topology. 477

The main idea of Algorithm 1 consists in using local selection functions  $f_a$  and  $f_r$  for append and read operations respectively and characterizing blocks by their parents and producer signatures.

To perform an append operation of a block b, correct processes extend the chain returned by function  $f_a$  applied on their current view of bt with b, i.e.,  $f_a(bt) \frown b$ , and rb-broadcast  $f_a(bt) \frown b$ . When a process rb-delivers a blockchain bc, it calls bt.addlfValid(bc) that merges bcwith bt if the former is valid. By merging bc with bt we mean that for each block  $b_i$  of bcstarting from the genesis block  $b_0$ , if  $b_i$  is not present in bt then  $b_i$  is added to bt, i.e.,  $b_i$  is added to the block of bt whose hash is equal to the one contained in  $b_i$ 's header. A read()

**Algorithm 1**  $\mathcal{EF}^*$  with an unbounded number of Byzantine processes

1 upon rb-delivery(bc) 2 | bt.addIfValid(bc) 3 end 4 upon append(b) 5 | rb-broadcast( $f_a(bt) \frown b$ ) 6 end 7 upon read() 8 | return  $f_r(bt)$ 9 end

operation triggered by a correct process p returns the chain selected by  $f_r$  on the current 487 blocktree bt of p. Given a blocktree bt, the append selection function  $f_a$  selects a chain in bt 488 by going from the root (i.e., genesis block) to a leaf, choosing at each fork  $b_i$  the edge to the 489 child with the lowest identifier. If more than one child have the same identifier (i.e., they 490 have been created by the same process), then all of them are ignored. If all the children have 491 the same identifier, then  $f_a$  returns the chain from the genesis block to  $b_i$ . Blocks are ranked 492 by the creator identifier, in the domain of the natural number and thus lower bounded by 0. 493 Then even though, an infinite number of blocks is added continuously to a fork, there is not, 494 for a given block, an infinite number of blocks with a smaller identifier. Thus eventually the 495 selection function  $f_a$  will always select the same prefix. Finally, since blocks are diffused by 496 an eventually reliable broadcast primitive, eventually all correct processes will have the same 497 view of the blocktree. When a process invokes the read() operation, it returns the blockchain 498 selected by the read selection function  $f_r$  applied to its current view of the blocktree. By 499 imposing that  $f_r = f_a$ , then eventually all the processes, when reading, will select the same 500 prefix. 501

**Theorem 14.** Algorithm 1 is a solution for  $\mathcal{EF}^*$  in an asynchronous system with a possibly infinite set of processes which can append infinitely many blocks, and suffer from an unbounded number of Byzantine failures.

**Proof.** We show by construction that Algorithm 1 solves  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  in an asynchronous system 505 with a possibly infinite set of processes which can append infinitely many blocks, and can 506 suffer an unbounded number of Byzantine failures. Intuitively, despite the unbounded number 507 of blocks in each fork, by the eventually reliable broadcast, eventually for each fork all correct 508 processes have the same block with the smallest identifier. Hence, by the read selection 509 function  $f_r$  that at each fork selects the block with the smallest identifier in order to select 510 the chain to return, eventually, at all correct processes, function  $f_r$  returns the blockchain 511 having a common increasing prefix. Let  $p_1, p_2, \ldots$ , be a possibly infinite set of processes, 512 such that each one maintains its local view  $bt_i$  of blocktree bt by running Algorithm 1. Then 513 for any correct process  $p_i$  the following properties hold. 514

<sup>515</sup> **Chain validity:** it is satisfied by function bt.addlfValid(bc) that merges blockchain bc to <sup>516</sup>  $bt_i$  only if the former is valid.

**Chain integrity:** The read() operation returns the chain of blocks selected by function  $f_r$  applied to  $bt_i$ . By Line 2 of Algorithm 1, only valid blocks are locally added to  $bt_i$ once they have been reliably delivered. By Algorithm 1, the only place at which blocks are reliably broadcast is in the append() operation.

**Eventual prefix:** This property follows from the definition of  $f_a$  and the eventually

reliable broadcast primitive. Thanks to the latter, for any b in the bt of a correct process 522 p, eventually all correct processes deliver b. Let  $t_b$  be the time after which no process can 523 append further blocks  $b_{child}$  to b such that  $b_{child}$  is part of the chain returned by  $f_a$ . This 524 time  $t_b$  always exists, as for each block b having potentially infinitely many children we 525 have, by definition of function  $f_a$ , that  $f_a(bt)$  selects a chain in bt by going from the root 526 to a leaf, choosing at each fork b the edge to the child with the lowest identifier. Since 527 identifiers are lower bounded by 0, eventually function  $f_a$  will always select the same 528 child b' of b. The same argument applies for b' and its children. Hence, if any two correct 529 processes invoke the read operation infinitely many times, then as  $f_r = f_a$ , eventually 530 they return chains that satisfy the eventual prefix property. 531

**Ever growing tree:** This property relies on the fact that each fork has a finite number of blocks since there are finitely many processes and each (Byzantine or correct) process can contribute with at most one block per parent as multiple children created by the same process are ignored by  $f_a$ . Thus, eventually, new blocks contribute to the tree growth.

536

## 537 5.3 Eventually Synchronous Solution to $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$ with less than half of 538 Byzantine Processes

In this section we prove that  $\mathcal{EF}^{\Diamond c}$  is solvable in an eventually synchronous message-passing system with less than n/2 Byzantine processes, where n is the number of processes.

<sup>541</sup> We propose an algorithm, called  $\mathcal{AF}$  for Accountable Forking. This algorithm is inspired <sup>542</sup> by the Streamlet [6] algorithm. Streamlet [6] assumes the presence of less than a third of <sup>543</sup> Byzantine processes and an eventually synchronous system with a known message delay  $\Delta$ <sup>544</sup> after GST. Algorithm  $\mathcal{AF}$  relies on weaker assumptions: we assume the presence of only <sup>545</sup> a majority of correct processes and we do not explicitly use bound  $\Delta$ . We suppose that <sup>546</sup> processes have access to the eventually reliable broadcast presented in Section 5.2. Prior to <sup>547</sup> presenting our algorithm, let us first describe the original Streamlet.

The Streamlet Algorithm. The Streamlet algorithm works in an eventually syn-548 chronous system with a known message delay  $\Delta$  and a finite set of n processes. In particular, 549 before the Global Stabilisation Time (GST), message delays can be arbitrary; however, after 550 GST, messages sent by correct processes are guaranteed to be received by correct processes 551 within  $\Delta$  time units. Each epoch, composed of  $2\Delta$  time units, has a designated leader chosen 552 at random by a publicly known hash function. Each block b is labelled with the epoch 553 (b.epoch) at which it has been created. This allows processes to determine whether block b 554 has been created by a legitimate leader. The protocol works as follows: 555

**Propose-Vote.** In every epoch:

557 558 The epoch's designated leader proposes a new block and reliably broadcasts it, extending the longest notarized chain (defined below) it has seen, or breaking ties arbitrarily if they have the same height.

559 560

561

Each process votes (rb-broadcasts a vote) for the first proposal it sees from the epoch's leader, as long as the proposed block extends (one of) the longest notarized chain(s) that the voter has seen. A vote is a signature on the proposed block.

562 563 564

When a block gains votes from at least 2n/3 distinct processes, it becomes notarized. A chain is notarized if its constituent blocks are all notarized.

Finalize. Notarized does not mean final. If in any notarized chain, there are three
 adjacent blocks with consecutive epoch numbers, the prefix of the chain up to the second
 of the three blocks is considered final. When a block becomes final, all of its prefixes
 must be final too.


The Accountable Forking  $(\mathcal{AF})$  Algorithm. The  $\mathcal{AF}$  algorithm extends Streamlet by 569 guaranteeing that for any given fork, correct processes can blame the process that originates 570 it, i.e., a Byzantine process creating a fork is accountable for it. This is achieved as follows: 571 First, we only require that a block gains votes from a majority of distinct processes to 572 become notarized, which means that forks can occur. The second modification we propose 573 goes deeper: if a fork occurs, any correct processes can detect the Byzantine process that 574 originated it, and excludes it from the voters. Specifically, when two conflicting chains are 575 finalized (i.e., two finalized chains that are not the prefix of one another) then processes look 576 for inconsistent blocks. By definition, two notarized blocks b, b' are inconsistent with one 577 another if one of the following two conditions holds: 578

- **Condition 1.** b and b' share the same epoch, i.e, b.epoch = b'.epoch;
- **Condition 2.** either ((b.epoch < b'.epoch) and (b.height > b'.height)) or ((b'.epoch < b.epoch) and (b'.height > b.height)). Function height counts the number of blocks from the genesis block.
- If a process votes for blocks inconsistent with one another then it is detected as Byzantine. Once a correct process p detects a Byzantine process q, p ignores all messages coming from q. Since all messages received by a correct process q are eventually received by any correct process, then all of them do the same with respect to q.
- ▶ Theorem 15. There exists a solution that solves eventual immediate finality in an eventually synchronous system with less than n/2 Byzantine processes, where n is the number of processes participating to the algorithm.

<sup>590</sup> **Proof.** We show that algorithm  $\mathcal{AF}$  is such a solution.

Let us first demonstrate that voting for two inconsistent blocks b and b' is a Byzantine 591 failure. We have two cases to consider. If both b and b' are inconsistent because Condition 1 592 holds, then the intersecting voters are Byzantine as correct processes vote only once per epoch. 593 Hence if process q votes for b and b' then q is Byzantine. If both b and b' are inconsistent 594 because Condition 2 is met, then the intersecting voters are Byzantine, as correct processes 595 vote only for blocks extending one of the longest notarized chains. That is, if correct process 596 p votes for b it means that b is extending a notarized block  $b_{pred}$  that is of height b.height - 1, 597 therefore p cannot vote afterwards for a block b' whose height is strictly smaller than b.height 598 because p must extend one of the longest notarized chain. It follows that if process q votes 599 for both b and b' then q is Byzantine. 600

Let us now show that a fork occurs because of two inconsistent blocks. If there is a 601 fork then this gives rise to two sequences of three adjacent blocks with consecutive epochs, 602  $b_1, b_2, b_3$  and  $b'_1, b'_2, b'_3$  (by construction given the finalization rule). If no blocks share the 603 same epoch number then we can assume w.l.o.g. that  $b_3.epoch < b'_1.epoch$ . Let block b' 604 belonging to the prefix of  $b'_3$  such that  $b'.epoch > b_1.epoch$  and b'.height is the smallest in the 605 prefix of  $b'_3$ . Such block always exists as  $b'_1$  satisfies those two conditions. We have two cases: 606 Either b'.height  $< b_3$ .height or b'.height  $\ge b_3$ .height. In the former case, b' is inconsistent 607 with  $b_3$  since by assumption  $b'.epoch > b_3.epoch$ . In the latter case, the predecessor of b'608 is inconsistent with  $b_3$ . Indeed, the predecessor of b' has a strictly smaller height than  $b_1$ 609 and by assumption has a larger epoch number than  $b_3$ . Figure 1 illustrates the presence 610 of inconsistent blocks in presence of a fork at some block  $b_c$ . From  $b_c$  two chains are built, 611 the first one consisting of the sequence of three blocks  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$  and  $b_3$ , and the second chain 612 consisting of four consecutive blocks  $b_d, b'_1, b'_2, b'_3$  (to illustrate the first case) and of five 613 consecutive blocks  $b_d, b_e, b'_1, b'_2, b'_3$  (to illustrate the second case). In both cases block  $b'_1$  plays 614 the role of block b'. In the first case (figure in the top),  $b_3$ . height = 6 and b'. height = 5 while 615



**Figure 1** Illustration of block inconsistencies due to the occurrence of a fork when the finalized blocks are not labelled with the same epoch. Epochs are on the x axis, and all consecutive blocks have consecutive epochs, e.g.,  $b_c$  and  $b_d$  have four epochs of difference, 4 and 7 respectively, while  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  are labelled with consecutive epochs.


<sup>616</sup>  $b_3.epoch = 6$  and b'.height = 5. Thus Condition 2 applies. In the second case (figure in <sup>617</sup> the bottom), since  $b'.height \ge b3.height$  then there must exist some block  $b_e$  in the b' prefix. <sup>618</sup> Thus  $b_e.height < b'.height$ . Given that by assumption  $b_e.epoch > b_3.epoch$ , then Condition 2 <sup>619</sup> holds for  $b_e$  and  $b_3$ . Hence there is always a couple of inconsistent blocks in a fork.

Let us now conclude our proof that protocol  $\mathcal{AF}$  solves eventual immediate finality. If a fork occurs, then each correct process eventually detects at least one Byzantine process and ignores its votes. Thus, the number of forks is finite since we have a finite number of Byzantine processes. As a consequence, there is always a single chain that is eventually finalized. As there is a majority of correct processes, algorithm  $\mathcal{AF}$  remains live as the original Streamlet one. Algorithm  $\mathcal{AF}$  also inherits the properties of the original Streamlet algorithm regarding the eventual finalization of blocks when the system becomes synchronous.

#### 627 6 Conclusion

In this work we have focused on the formalisation of eventual finality, which ensures that 628 selected main chains at different processes share a common increasing prefix. We have 629 formalised different forms of eventual finality in terms of the maximal number of blocks 630 that can be revoked at each reconciliation, which is a crux in current blockchain designs. 631 We have formally shown that in an asynchronous system is not possible to reach a bound 632 on the number of blocks that can be revoked. On the other hand, we proposed for the 633 first time a solution in an eventually synchronous system with less than half of Byzantine 634 processes guaranteeing that such bound is reached eventually. We have also shown that in 635 an asynchronous system eventual finality with no bound on the number of revocable blocks 636 cannot be solved using the reconciliation rule of Bitcoin. Still we provide an asynchronous 637 solution with an unlimited number of Byzantine processes. We hope that this work will 638 better guide blockchain designs. 639

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**Figure 2** A blocktree generated by two processes. On the x-axis the longest chain value of each chain at different time instants (from the root to the current leaf) and the relationships between those values.

#### 691 Appendix

<sup>692</sup> **Theorem 13** It is impossible to guarantee  $\mathcal{EF}^{\star}$  if the append operation is based on the <sup>693</sup> longest chain rule in an asynchronous environment.

<sup>694</sup> **Proof.** In the proof we consider the stronger oracle allowing the occurrence of one fork, i.e., <sup>695</sup> an oracle with branching factor equal to 2. That is, this oracle allows for two valid blocks to <sup>696</sup> be appended to the same parent. If the oracle receives new requests to append additional <sup>697</sup> blocks to this parent, it shall return  $\perp$  to all such requests.

Let  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  be two processes trying to append infinitely many blocks. Without loss of generality, we carry out this proof with a length function that counts the number of blocks from the genesis block.

We illustrate our proof with Figure 2. At time  $t_0$ , for both  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , the update view() 701 of bt equals  $b_0$ , thus when both apply the append selection function  $f_a$  on it to select the leaf 702 where to append the new block, they both get  $b_0$ . Then they both call getValidBlock $(b_0, b_{i,1}) =$ 703  $b'_i$ , where i = 1 for  $p_1$  and i = 2 for  $p_2$ . At time  $t_1 > t_0$ ,  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  are poised to call 704 setValidBlock $(b_0, b'_{i,1})$ . We then let  $p_1$  call setValidBlock $(b_0, b'_{1,1})$ , which must return  $\top$  and 705 hence  $b'_{1,1}$  is appended to  $b_0$ . Process  $p_1$  then proceeds to append a new block  $b_{1,2}$ , i.e., after 706 having updated its bt's view, through the update\_view() function,  $p_1$  applies the append 707 selection function  $f_a$  on it to select the leaf where to append its new block, in this case the 708 only leaf is  $b'_{1,1}$ . It calls getValidBlock $(b'_{1,1}, b_{1,2})$  function which returns  $\{b'_{1,2}\}$  and it is poised 709 to call setValidBlock $(b'_{1,1}, b'_{1,2})$ . 710

We let  $p_1$  continue to append new blocks until some time  $t_2$  at which it is poised to 711 call setValidBlock $(b'_{1,h}, b'_{1,h+1})$ , with h = 1, such that the length of the chain  $b_0, \ldots, b'_{1,h+1}$ 712 would be greater than or would have the same length but a smaller lexicographical order 713 than the chain  $b_0, b'_{2,1}$  if  $b'_{2,1}$  were already appended to block  $b_0$ . Afterwards, at time  $t_3 \ge t_2$ , 714 we let  $p_2$  resume and complete its call to setValidBlock $(b_0, b'_{2,1})$  which must also succeed 715 and return  $\top$  as our oracle has a branching factor of 2. By construction,  $p_2$  sees the two 716 branches in its following update\_view() of bt (i.e., chain  $b_0, b'_{1,h}$  with h = 1, and chain  $b_0, b'_{2,1}$ ) 717 of the same length thus the selection function  $f_a$  selects the branch  $b_0, b'_{2,1}$  for where to 718 append the next block as block  $b'_{2,1}$  is smaller than  $b'_{1,h}$  in the lexicographical order. We 719 let  $p_2$  append blocks to this branch until some time  $t_4$  at which it becomes poised to call 720 setValidBlock $(b'_{2,c}, b'_{2,c+1})$  with c = 2 such that the length of the chain  $b_0, \ldots, b'_{2,c}$  is smaller 721 than the chain  $b_0, \ldots, b'_{1,h+1}$ , or in case of equal length has a higher lexicographical order, 722 and such that the length of the chain  $b_0, \ldots, b'_{2,c+1}$  is greater than the chain  $b_0, \ldots, b'_{1,h+1}$ , 723 or in case of equal length has a smaller lexicographical order. 724

As before, it is time to stop the execution of  $p_2$  and resume the execution of  $p_1$  and to let it complete its call to setValidBlock $(b'_{1,h}, b'_{1,h+1})$ . We can continue to create two

infinite branches sharing only the root by alternatively letting  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  extend their own 727 branch while stopping one and resuming the execution of the other each time its length 728 would overcome the length of the other branch extended with the pending block (and the 729 appropriate lexicographical orderings in case of equal length). This way we construct a tree 730 composed of two infinite branches sharing only the root  $b_0$  as common prefix. It is easy to 731 see that we can integrate read operations that may return the current chain from any branch 732 as both branches are temporarily the longest one. Thus, the common prefix never increases, 733 and so, the eventual finality consistency criterion is not satisfied. 734

It is important to note that with any length function that increases monotonically with prefixes (e.g, the length function could count the total number of transactions that belong to the blocks on the same branch) then this scenario still holds. In that case h and c in the proof could be larger than 1 and 2 respectively.