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On Finality in Blockchains

Emmanuelle Anceaume @ H ORCID

CNRS, Inria, Université Rennes, IRISA, Campus de beaulieu, 35042 Rennes, France

Antonella Del Pozzo @

Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List, F-91120, Palaiseau, France

Thibault Rieutord @

Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List, F-91120, Palaiseau, France

Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni @

Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List, F-91120, Palaiseau, France

Abstract

This paper focuses on blockchain finality, which refers to the time when it becomes impossible to remove a block that has previously been appended to the blockchain. Blockchain finality can be deterministic or probabilistic, immediate or eventual. To favor availability against consistency in the face of partitions, most blockchains only offer probabilistic eventual finality: blocks may be revoked after being appended to the blockchain, yet with decreasing probability as they sink deeper into the chain. Other blockchains favor consistency by leveraging the immediate finality of Consensus – a block appended is never revoked – at the cost of additional synchronization.

The quest for "good" deterministic finality properties for blockchains is still in its infancy, though. Our motivation is to provide a thorough study of several possible deterministic finality properties and explore their solvability. This is achieved by introducing the notion of bounded revocation, which informally says that the number of blocks that can be revoked from the current blockchain is bounded. Based on the requirements we impose on this revocation number, we provide reductions between different forms of eventual finality, Consensus and Eventual Consensus. From these reductions, we show some related impossibility results in presence of Byzantine processes, and provide non-trivial results. In particular, we provide an algorithm that solves a weak form of eventual finality in an asynchronous system in presence of an unbounded number of Byzantine processes. We also provide an algorithm that solves eventual finality with a bounded revocation number in an eventually synchronous environment in presence of less than half of Byzantine processes. The simplicity of the arguments should better guide blockchain designs and link them to clear formal properties of finality.

2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation

Keywords and phrases Blockchain, consistency properties, Byzantine tolerant implementations

1 Introduction

This paper focuses on blockchain finality, which refers to the time when it becomes impossible to remove a block previously appended to the blockchain. Blockchain finality can be deterministic or probabilistic, immediate or eventual.

Informally, immediate finality guarantees, as its name suggests, that when a block is appended to a local copy, it is immediately finalized and thus will never be revoked in the future. Designing blockchains with immediate finality favors consistency against availability in presence of transient partitions of the system. It leverages the properties of Consensus (i.e. a decision value is unique and agreed by everyone), at the cost of synchronization constraints. Assuming partially synchronous environments, most of the permissioned blockchains satisfy the deterministic form of immediate consistency, as for example Red Belly blockchain [8] and Hyperledger Fabric blockchain [2]. The probabilistic form of immediate finality is typically achieved by permissionless pure proof-of-stake blockchains such as Algorand [7].

Unlike immediate finality, eventual finality only ensures that eventually all local copies of the blockchain share a common increasing prefix, and thus finality of their blocks increases

47 as more blocks are appended to the blockchain. The majority of cryptoassets blockchains,
 48 with Bitcoin [20] and Ethereum [25] as celebrated examples, guarantee eventual finality
 49 with some probability: blocks may be revoked after being appended to the blockchain, yet
 50 with decreasing probability as they sink deeper into the chain. In an effort to replace the
 51 energy-wasting pow method of Bitcoin and Ethereum, recent proof-of-stake blockchains such
 52 as e.g. [16, 12, 15] emerged. These blockchains offer as well a form of eventual finality. More
 53 broadly, all these permission-less solutions favor availability (or progress) only relying on a
 54 broadcast primitive to diffuse blocks and a local reconciliation mechanism to select a unique
 55 chain. It is indeed admitted that a blockchain may lose consistency by incurring a fork,
 56 which is the presence of multiple chains at different processes. The reconciliation mechanism,
 57 available to recover from a fork, consists in a local deterministic rule selecting a chain among
 58 the different possible alternatives. In Bitcoin for instance any participant reconciles the state
 59 following the "longest" chain rule (the term "longest" chain rule is commonly employed, but
 60 this is actually the one that required the most work to be built). Once a winner chain is
 61 chosen, the other alternatives are revoked, as such all the blocks belonging to them. In these
 62 designs, however, network effects make the moment at which all honest processes observe the
 63 same set of candidate chains unknown. Reconciliation and finalisation guarantees are then
 64 unsure, or simply extremely inefficient, for example by considering a block as finalised after
 65 one or more days. To solve this problem a number of permissionless blockchain projects are
 66 investigating how to add "finality gadgets" (e.g., [5, 24]) to proof-of-work or proof-of-stake
 67 blockchains, which means seeking additional mechanisms or protocols to reach "better" finality
 68 properties in network adversarial settings. The hope is to find ways to get deterministic
 69 finality by periodically running finality gadgets. For the time being, the only way that has
 70 been concretely pursued is to resort to Byzantine Consensus – e.g. Tenderbake [4] adds
 71 Byzantine Consensus to the existing proof-of-stake method assuring deterministic finality
 72 to each block followed by other two blocks. How to add mechanisms that do not resort to
 73 Consensus, however, is an intriguing and open question, related to the finality properties one
 74 would like to guarantee.

75 The quest for "good" deterministic finality properties for blockchains is still in its infancy,
 76 though. Our motivation is to provide a protocol-independent abstraction of several possible
 77 finality properties to study their solvability. To this aim we formalise, for the first time, the
 78 notion of finality in a protocol-agnostic way. At the heart of the proposed formalisation lies
 79 the notion of *bounded revocation*. Bounded revocation informally says that the number of
 80 blocks that can be revoked from the current blockchain is bounded. Providing solutions
 81 that guarantee deterministic bounded revocation reveals to be an important crux in the
 82 construction of blockchains. We thus provide rigorous definitions for the weakest form of
 83 eventual finality \mathcal{EF}^* , which does not guarantee any bound on the number of blocks that
 84 can be revoked from the blockchain at any given fork, and two stronger forms: $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$, in
 85 which revocation is bounded but unknown, and \mathcal{EF}^c , in which revocation is bounded and
 86 known. Intuitively, if \mathcal{EF}^c holds, processes revoke at most a constant number c of blocks
 87 from the current blockchain at each reconciliation, while if $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ holds, processes revoke
 88 at most a constant number of c blocks from the current chain only eventually, i.e., after a
 89 finite but unknown number of reconciliations. The rigorous formalisation of these properties
 90 enable us to easily show that solutions that guarantee \mathcal{EF}^c are equivalent to Consensus,
 91 while solutions that guarantee $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ are not weaker than Eventual Consensus, an abstraction
 92 that captures eventual agreement among all participants. From these reductions, we show
 93 some related impossibility results in presence of Byzantine processes. Beside reductions and
 94 related impossibilities, we propose the following non-trivial results:

- 95 ■ \mathcal{EF}^* cannot be achieved in an asynchronous system if the reconciliation rule follows
 96 the "longest" chain rule (Theorem 13). This implies that the reconciliation rule, used
 97 in current blockchains to provide probabilistic finality in synchronous settings, cannot
 98 guarantee that participants will eventually converge to a stable prefix of the chain in
 99 asynchronous settings.
- 100 ■ A solution that guarantees \mathcal{EF}^* in an asynchronous system with a possibly infinite set
 101 of processes which can append infinitely many blocks. This novel solution is strikingly
 102 simple and tolerant to an unbounded number of Byzantine processes (Theorem 14).
- 103 ■ A solution that solves $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ in an eventually synchronous environment in presence of less
 104 than half of Byzantine processes (Theorem 15). The central point of our solution is to let
 105 correct processes blame each fork on a particular Byzantine process, which can then be
 106 excluded from the computation. Weakening the classic requirement of $< 1/3$ to $< 1/2$
 107 Byzantine processes makes such a solution well adapted to large scale adversarial systems.
 108 As for the previous one, we are not aware of any such solution in the literature.

109 We hope that these results will better guide blockchain designs and link them to clear
 110 formal properties of finality. Hence, in the remainder of this article, Section 2 situates our
 111 work with respect to similar ones. Section 3 formally presents the sequential specification of
 112 a blockchain and the formalisation of the different finality properties we may expect from
 113 a blockchain when concurrently accessed. Section 4 presents reductions between different
 114 forms of finality, Consensus and Eventual Consensus. Section 5 first shows why \mathcal{EF}^* is not
 115 solvable in an asynchronous environment when the "heaviest" chain rule is used, and then
 116 presents two original and surprisingly simple algorithms that respectively solve \mathcal{EF}^* and
 117 $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

118 **2 Related Work**

119 Formalization of blockchains in the lens of distributed computing has been recognized as an
 120 extremely important topic [14]. Garay et al. [10] have been the first to analyze the Bitcoin
 121 backbone protocol and to define invariants this protocol has to satisfy to verify with high
 122 probability an eventual consistent prefix, i.e. probabilistic eventual finality. The authors
 123 have analyzed the protocol in a synchronous system, while others, as for example Pass et
 124 al. [21], have extended this line of work considering a more adversarial network. In those
 125 works the specification of the consistency properties are protocol dependent and thus provide
 126 an abstraction level that does not allow us to model the blockchain as a shared object being
 127 agnostic of the way it is implemented. The objective we pursue throughout this work is to
 128 formalize the semantic of the interface between the blockchain and the users. To do so we
 129 consider the blockchain as a shared object, and thus the consistency properties are specified
 130 independently of the synchrony assumptions of underlying distributed system and the type of
 131 failures that may occur. By doing this, we offer a higher level of abstraction than well-known
 132 properties do.

133 This approach has been recently followed in particular by Anta et al. [3], Anceaume et
 134 al. [1] and Guerraoui et al. [13]¹. In Anta et al. [3], the authors propose a formalization of
 135 distributed ledgers, modeled as an ordered list of records along with implementations for
 136 sequential consistency and linearizability using a total order broadcast abstraction. Anceaume

¹ While not related to the blockchain data structure, authors of [13] have formalized the notion of
 cryptocurrency showing that Consensus is not needed.

137 et al. [1] have captured the convergence process of two distinct classes of blockchain systems:
 138 the class providing strong prefix as [3] (for each pair of chains returned at two different
 139 processes, one is the prefix of the other) and the class providing eventual prefix, in which
 140 multiple chains can co-exist but the common prefix eventually converges. The authors of [1]
 141 show that to solve strong prefix the Consensus abstraction is needed, however they do not
 142 address solvability of eventual prefix and do not formalise finality. Interestingly, our notion
 143 of finality and bounded revocation is able to encompass the strong and the eventual prefix
 144 consistency properties of [1].

145 **3** Definitions

146 **3.1** Preliminary Definitions

147 We describe a blockchain object as an abstract data type which allows us to completely
 148 characterize a blockchain by the operations it exports [18]. The basic idea underlying the
 149 use of abstract data types is to specify shared objects using two complementary facets: a
 150 sequential specification that describes the semantics of the object, and a consistency criterion
 151 over concurrent histories, i.e. the set of admissible executions in a concurrent environment [22].
 152 Prior to presenting the blockchain abstract data type we first recall the formalization used
 153 to describe an abstract data type (ADT).

154 **3.1.1** Abstract data types.

155 An abstract data type (ADT) is a tuple of the form $T = (A, B, Z, z_0, \tau, \delta)$. Here A and B
 156 are countable sets respectively called *input alphabet* and *output alphabet*. Z is a countable
 157 set of abstract object *states* and $z_0 \in Z$ is the initial abstract state. The map $\tau : Z \times A \rightarrow Z$
 158 is the *transition function*, specifying the effect of an input on the object state and the
 159 map $\delta : Z \times A \rightarrow B$ is the *output function*, specifying the output returned for a given input
 160 and an object local state. An input represents an operation with its parameters, where (i)
 161 the operation can have a side-effect that changes the abstract state according to transition
 162 function τ and (ii) the operation can return values taken in the output B , which depends on
 163 the state in which it is called and the output function δ .

164 **3.1.2** Concurrent histories of an ADT

165 Concurrent histories are defined considering asymmetric event structures, i.e., partial order
 166 relations among events executed by different processes.

167 ► **Definition 1. (Concurrent history H)** *The execution of a program that uses an abstract*
 168 *data type $T = \langle A, B, Z, \xi_0, \tau, \delta \rangle$ defines a concurrent history $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \nearrow \rangle$, where*

- 169 ■ $\Sigma = A \cup (A \times B)$ is a countable set of operations;
- 170 ■ E is a countable set of events that contains all the ADT operations invocations and all
 171 ADT operation response events;
- 172 ■ $\Lambda : E \rightarrow \Sigma$ is a function which associates events to the operations in Σ ;
- 173 ■ \mapsto : is the process order, irreflexive order over the events of E . Two events $(e, e') \in E^2$
 174 are ordered by \mapsto if they are produced by the same process, $e \neq e'$ and e happens before e' ,
 175 that is denoted as $e \mapsto e'$.
- 176 ■ \prec : is the operation order, irreflexive order over the events of E . For each couple
 177 $(e, e') \in E^2$ if e' is the invocation of an operation occurred at time t' and e is the response
 178 of another operation occurred at time t with $t < t'$ then $e \prec e'$;

179 ■ \nearrow : is the program order, irreflexive order over E , for each couple $(e, e') \in E^2$ with $e \neq e'$
 180 if $e \mapsto e'$ or $e \prec e'$ then $e \nearrow e'$.

181 3.2 The blocktree ADT

182 We represent a blockchain as a tree of blocks. The same representation has been adopted
 183 in [1]. Indeed, while consensus-based blockchains prevent forks or branching in the tree of
 184 blocks, blockchain systems based on proof-of-work allow the occurrence of forks to happen
 185 hence presenting blocks under a tree structure. The blockchain object is thus defined as a
 186 blocktree abstract data type (Blocktree ADT).

187 3.2.1 Sequential Specification of the Blocktree ADT (BT-ADT)

188 A blocktree data structure is a directed rooted tree $bt = (V_{bt}, E_{bt})$ where V_{bt} represents a
 189 set of blocks and E_{bt} a set of edges such that each block has a single path towards the root
 190 of the tree b_0 called the genesis block. A branching in the tree is called a *fork*. Let \mathcal{BT} be
 191 the set of blocktrees, \mathcal{B} be the countable and non empty set of uniquely identified blocks
 192 and let \mathcal{BC} be the countable non empty set of blockchains, where a blockchain is a path
 193 from a leaf of bt to b_0 . A blockchain is denoted by bc . The structure is equipped with two
 194 operations `append()` and `read()`. Operation `append(b)` adds block $b \notin bt$ to V_{bt} and adds the
 195 edge (b, b') to E_{bt} where $b' \in V_{bt}$ is returned by the append selection function $f_a()$ applied to
 196 bt . Operation `read()` returns the chain bc selected by the read selection function $f_r()$ applied
 197 to bt (note that in [1], the `read()` and `append()` operations are defined with a unique selection
 198 function). The read selection $f_r()$ takes as argument the blocktree and returns a chain of
 199 blocks, that is a sequence of blocks starting from the genesis block to a leaf block of the
 200 blocktree. The chain bc returned by a `read()` operation r is called the blockchain, and is
 201 denoted by r/bc . The append selection function $f_a()$ takes as argument the blocktree and
 202 returns a chain of blocks. Function `last_block()` takes as argument a chain of blocks and
 203 returns the last appended block of the chain. Only blocks satisfying some validity predicate
 204 P can be appended to the tree. Predicate P is an application-dependent predicate used to
 205 verify the validity of the chain obtained by appending the new block b to the chain returned
 206 by $f_a()$ (denoted by $f_a(bt) \frown b$). In Bitcoin for instance this predicate embeds the logic to
 207 verify that the obtained chain does not contain double spending or overspending transactions.
 208 Formally,

209 ► **Definition 2.** (*Sequential specification of the Blocktree ADT*) The Blocktree Abstract Data
 210 Type is the 6-tuple $\text{BT-ADT} = \{A = \{\text{append}(b), \text{read}()\}/bc \in \mathcal{BC}\}, B = \mathcal{BC} \cup \{\top, \perp\}, Z =$
 211 $\mathcal{BT}, \xi_0 = b_0, \tau, \delta\}$, where the transition function $\tau : Z \times A \rightarrow Z$ is defined by

$$212 \quad \tau(bt, \text{read}()) = bt$$

$$213 \quad \tau(bt, \text{append}(b)) = \begin{cases} (V_{bt} \cup \{b\}, E_{bt} \cup \{b, \text{last_block}(f_a(bt))\}) & \text{if } P(f_a(bt) \frown b) \\ bt & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

214 and where the output function $\delta : Z \times A \rightarrow B$ is defined by

$$215 \quad \delta(bt, \text{read}()) = f_r(bt)$$

$$216 \quad \delta(bt, \text{append}(b)) = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } P(f_a(bt) \frown b) \\ \perp & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

217 Note that we do not need to add the validity check during the `read` operation in the
 218 sequential specification of the Blocktree ADT because in absence of concurrency the validity
 219 check during the `append` operation is enough.
 220
 221

222 3.2.2 Concurrent Specification and Consistency Criteria of the 223 BlockTree ADT

224 The concurrent specification of the blocktree abstract data type is the set of its concurrent
225 histories. A blocktree consistency criterion is a function that returns the set of concurrent
226 histories admissible for the blocktree abstract data type. In this paper, we define three consi-
227 sistency criteria for the blocktree, i.e. the *BT eventual finality (EF)*, the *BT immediate finality*
228 (*IF*) and *BT eventual immediate finality (EIF)*, and the notion of block revocation. This
229 family of consistency criteria combined with the revocation notion provides a comprehensive
230 characterization of what we may expect from blockchains.

231 ► Notation 1.

- 232 ■ $E(a^*, r^*)$ is an infinite set containing an infinite number of `append()` and `read()` invocation
233 and response events;
- 234 ■ $E(a, r^*)$ is an infinite set containing (i) a finite number of `append()` invocation and
235 response events and (ii) an infinite number of `read()` invocation and response events;
- 236 ■ o_{inv} and o_{rsp} indicate respectively the invocation and response event of an operation o ;
237 and in particular for the `read()` operation, r_{rsp}/bc denotes the returned blockchain bc
238 associated with the response event r_{rsp} and for the `append()` operation $a_{inv}(b)$ denotes the
239 invocation of the append operation having b as input parameter;
- 240 ■ $\text{length} : \mathcal{BC} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ denotes a monotonic increasing deterministic function that takes as input
241 a blockchain bc and returns a natural number as length of bc . Increasing monotonicity
242 means that $\text{length}(bc \hat{\ } \{b\}) > \text{length}(bc)$;
- 243 ■ We represent chain bc as an infinite list $b_0 b^* \perp^+$ of blocks, where the first block $bc[0] = b_0$,
244 the genesis block, followed by block values b , and an infinite number of \perp values. Notation
245 $bc[i]$ refers to the i -th block of blockchain bc . Note that the special “ \perp ” symbol counts for
246 zero for the length function.
- 247 ■ $bc \sqsubseteq bc'$ if and only if bc prefixes bc' . The operator \sqsubseteq ignores all the records set to \perp .

248 ► **Definition 3** (BT Eventual Finality Consistency criterion (EF)). A concurrent history
249 $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \nearrow \rangle$ of a system that uses a BT-ADT verifies the BT eventual finality
250 consistency criterion if the following four properties hold:

251 ■ Chain validity:

252 $\forall r_{rsp} \in E, P(r_{rsp}/bc)$.

253 Each returned chain is valid.

254 ■ Chain integrity:

255 $\forall r_{rsp} \in E, \forall b \in r_{rsp}/bc : b \neq b_0, \exists a_{inv}(b) \in E, a_{inv}(b) \nearrow r_{rsp}$.

256 If a block different from the genesis block is returned, then an `append` operation has been
257 invoked with this block as parameter. This property is to avoid the situation in which
258 reads return blocks never appended.

259 ■ Eventual prefix:

260 $\forall E \in E(a, r^*) \cup E(a^*, r^*), \forall r_{rsp}/bc, \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : bc[i] \neq \perp, \exists r'_{rsp}, \forall r''_{rsp} : r'_{rsp} \nearrow r''_{rsp},$
261 $((r'_{rsp}/bc')[i] = (r''_{rsp}/bc'')[i])$.

262 In all the histories in which the number of `read` invocations is infinite, then for any non
263 empty read chain at position i , there exists a `read` r'/bc' from which all the subsequent
264 reads r''/bc'' will return the same block at position i , i.e. $bc'[i] = bc''[i]$.

265 ■ Ever growing tree:

266 $\forall E \in E(a^*, r^*), \forall k \in \mathbb{N}, \exists r \in E : \text{length}(r_{rsp}/bc) > k$.

267 In all the histories in which the number of `append` and `read` invocations is infinite, for
268 each length k , there exists a `read` that returns a chain with length greater than k . This

269 property avoids the trivial scenario in which the length of the chain remains unchanged
 270 despite the occurrence of an infinite number of **append** operations (i.e., tree built as a star
 271 with infinite branches of bounded length). Specifically the “Ever growing tree” property
 272 imposes that in presence of an infinite number of **read** and **append** operations, for any
 273 natural number i , there will always exist a **read** operation that will return a chain of at
 274 least length i . Note that the well known “Chain Growth Property” [10, 21] states that
 275 each (honest) chain grows proportionally with the number of rounds of the protocol, which
 276 in contrast to our specification, makes it protocol dependent.

277 ► **Definition 4** (BT Immediate Finality Consistency criterion (IF)). A concurrent history
 278 $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \succ \rangle$ of the system that uses a BT-ADT verifies the BT immediate finality
 279 consistency criterion if chain validity, chain integrity, ever growing tree (as defined for EF)
 280 and the following property hold:

- 281 ■ **Strong prefix:** $\forall E \in E(a, r^*) \cup E(a^*, r^*), \forall r_{rsp}/bc, r'_{rsp}/bc', \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : bc[i] \neq \perp,$
- 282 ■ if $r_{rsp} \mapsto r'_{rsp}$ then $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \perp$
- 283 ■ otherwise
- 284 * either $bc'[i] \neq \perp$ and $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \perp$
- 285 * or $bc'[i] = \perp$ and $|\{r''/bc'' : bc''[i] = \perp\}| < \infty$

286 In all the histories in which the number of **read** invocations is infinite, and for any couple
 287 of **read** operations r and r' that return respectively bc and bc' , such that for any position
 288 i in bc , $bc[i]$ contains a value then, if both r and r' occur at the same process p and r
 289 occurs before r' , then bc is a prefix of bc' . Otherwise (r and r' do not occur on the same
 290 process) either bc' contains the same value as the one contained in bc or contains \perp . In
 291 that case, the overall number of **read** operations that return \perp at position i is finite.

292 ► **Definition 5** (BT Eventual Immediate Finality Consistency criterion (EIF)). A concurrent
 293 history $H = \langle \Sigma, E, \Lambda, \mapsto, \prec, \succ \rangle$ of the system that uses a BT-ADT verifies the BT eventual
 294 immediate finality consistency criterion if chain validity, chain integrity, ever growing tree
 295 (as defined for EF) and the following property hold:

- 296 ■ **Eventual Strong prefix:** $\forall E \in E(a, r^*) \cup E(a^*, r^*), \exists \ell \in \mathbb{N}, \forall r_{rsp}/bc, r'_{rsp}/bc', \forall i \geq$
- 297 $\ell \in \mathbb{N} : bc[i] \neq \perp,$
- 298 ■ if $r_{rsp} \mapsto r'_{rsp}$ then $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \perp$
- 299 ■ otherwise
- 300 * either $bc'[i] \neq \perp$ and $\forall j \leq i, bc'[j] = bc[j] \neq \perp$
- 301 * or $bc'[i] = \perp$ and $|\{r''/bc'' : bc''[i] = \perp\}| < \infty$

302 There exists a natural number ℓ , such that once the length of the chain is equal to ℓ , then
 303 the strong prefix property holds. Notice that, when the length of the chain is smaller than
 304 ℓ then values it contains may change from one read to another.

305 Bounded revocation

306 Informally, bounded revocation says that for any two reads r/bc and r'/bc' such that r
 307 precedes r' , then by pruning the last c blocks from bc the obtained chain is a prefix of bc' .
 308 Note that constant c can be initially known or not.

309 ► **Definition 6** (c -Bounded Revocation).

- 310 $\exists c \in \mathbb{N}, \forall r_{rsp}, r'_{rsp} \in E : r_{rsp} \succ r'_{rsp}, \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : i \leq (\text{length}(r_{rsp}/bc) - c)$ then $(r_{rsp}/bc)[i] =$
- 311 $(r'_{rsp}/bc')[i]$.

312 Note that the c -Bounded Revocation is not protocol dependent in contrast to the well-known
 313 “Common-Prefix Property” [10, 21], which states that for any two rounds r and r' of the
 314 protocol with $r < r'$, the (honest) chain read at round r from which the last c blocks have
 315 been pruned is a prefix of (resp. is equal to with high probability) the one read at round r' .

316 ► **Notation 2.** For readability reasons, in the following we will simply say *finality* instead of
 317 *finality consistency criterion*, i.e., eventual finality consistency criterion will be replaced by
 318 eventual finality, and (eventual) immediate finality consistency criterion will be replaced by
 319 (eventual) immediate finality.

320 We can now define the c -Bounded Eventual Finality criteria by augmenting the previous
 321 consistency criteria with the Bounded revocation property:

322 ► **Definition 7.** c -Bounded Eventual Finality criteria

- 323 ■ $\mathcal{EF}^* = EF$, in this case the revocation is unbounded.
- 324 ■ $\mathcal{EF}^c = EIF$ combined with c -Bounded revocation, such that c is known a priori.
- 325 ■ $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c} = EIF$ combined with c -Bounded revocation where c is unknown but bounded.

326 4 (Eventual) Consensus Reductions

327 In this section we investigate the impact of the bounded revocation property on the construc-
 328 tion of a blocktree satisfying eventual finality. In particular, we show that when the bound c
 329 is known, this problem is equivalent to the Consensus abstraction, while when unknown, this
 330 problem is not weaker than the Eventual Consensus abstraction [9].

331 4.1 Known Bounded Revocation and Consensus

332 ► **Theorem 8.** \mathcal{EF}^c is equivalent to Consensus.

333 **Proof.** We first show how to solve immediate finality (IF) given a solution \mathcal{P} for \mathcal{EF}^c and then
 334 the reciprocal direction. Indeed, the equivalence between immediate finality and Consensus
 335 is known from [1]. So let us show that we can solve immediate finality using \mathcal{P} . To do so, we
 336 consider the following transformation from the protocol \mathcal{P} . To make an `append()` operation,
 337 processes simply use the `append()` operation provided by \mathcal{P} . But, for the `read()` operation,
 338 processes use the `read()` operation provided by \mathcal{P} to obtain a chain and prune the last c
 339 blocks from it before returning the remaining chain. Note that if there are less than c blocks,
 340 processes then return the genesis block.

341 Let us show that this modified protocol solves immediate finality. For this, we need to
 342 show that the following properties are satisfied:

- 343 ■ **Chain validity:** The chain validity property is still satisfied by pruning the last c blocks.
- 344 ■ **Chain integrity:** The chain integrity property is still satisfied by pruning the last c
 345 blocks.
- 346 ■ **Strong prefix:** The strong prefix property follows from the known bounded revocation
 347 property and the removal of the last c blocks. Indeed, if we remove the last c blocks, then
 348 for any two `read()` operations, then the first `read()` returns a prefix of the second `read()`
 349 operation.
- 350 ■ **Ever growing tree:** The ever growing tree property is still satisfied by pruning the last
 351 c blocks.

352 For the other direction, we can build a solution to \mathcal{EF}^c using a solution for immediate
 353 finality. This trivially solves \mathcal{EF}^c with $c = 0$. ◀

354 ► **Corollary 9.** *There does not exist any solution that solves \mathcal{EF}^c in an eventual synchronous*
 355 *system with more than $n/3$ Byzantine processes, where n is the number of processes partici-*
 356 *pating to the algorithm.*

357 **Proof.** The proof follows from the equivalence between \mathcal{EF}^c and Consensus (cf. Theorem 8),
 358 which is unsolvable in a synchronous (and thus also in an eventually synchronous) system
 359 with more than one third of Byzantine processes [17]. ◀

360 4.2 Unknown Bounded Revocation and Eventual Consensus

361 In this section we show that $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ is not weaker than Eventual Consensus. We first show its
 362 equivalence with eventual immediate finality (EIF). Later we recall the Eventual Consensus
 363 problem with a small modification of the validity property to make it suitable to the blockchain
 364 context and show that EIF is not weaker than Eventual Consensus.

365 ► **Theorem 10.** *$\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ is equivalent to eventual immediate finality.*

366 **Proof.** Let \mathcal{P}_1 be a protocol solving $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$, then by definition of $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$, \mathcal{P}_1 trivially solves
 367 eventual immediate finality.

368 For the other direction, let us consider a protocol \mathcal{P}_2 solving eventual immediate finality
 369 and let us show that it solves $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$. Eventual strong prefix property clearly implies the
 370 eventual prefix property. Let $\text{revocation}(b_1, b_2)$ be the function that takes two blockchains b_1
 371 and b_2 and returns the number of blocks needed to prune b_1 in order to obtain a chain b'_1 such
 372 that $b'_1 \sqsubseteq b_2$. Let us show that $\exists c \in \mathbb{N}, \forall r_{rsp}, r'_{rsp} \in E^2, r \not\prec r', \text{revocation}(r_{rsp}/bc, r'_{rsp}/bc) <$
 373 c . Assume by contradiction that this inequality is not satisfied. This implies that for any
 374 c , there exists a couple of reads with a greater revocation than c , and thus the eventual
 375 strong prefix property does not hold. A contradiction with the assumption. Hence eventual
 376 immediate finality implies $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$. Putting all together, we have shown that eventual immediate
 377 finality is equivalent to $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$. ◀

378 The Eventual Consensus (EC) abstraction [9] captures eventual agreement among all
 379 participants. It exports, to every process p_i , operations $\text{proposeEC}_1, \text{proposeEC}_2, \dots$ that
 380 take multi-valued arguments (correct processes propose valid values) and return multi-valued
 381 responses. Assuming that, for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$, every process invokes proposeEC_j as soon as it
 382 returns a response to proposeEC_{j-1} , the abstraction guarantees that, in every admissible run,
 383 there exists $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and a predicate P_{EC} , such that the following properties are satisfied:

- 384 ■ **EC-Termination.** Every correct process eventually returns a response to proposeEC_j
 385 for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$.
- 386 ■ **EC-Integrity.** No process responds twice to proposeEC_j for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$.
- 387 ■ **EC-Validity.** Every value returned to proposeEC_j is valid with respect to predicate P_{EC} .
- 388 ■ **EC-Agreement.** No two correct processes return different values to proposeEC_j for all
 389 $j \geq k$.

390 ► **Theorem 11.** *Eventual immediate finality is not weaker than Eventual Consensus.*

391 **Proof.** We show that there exists a protocol \mathcal{P}_1 that solves Eventual Consensus assuming the
 392 existence of a protocol \mathcal{P}_2 that solves eventual immediate finality. We do the transformation
 393 as follows. Every correct process p invokes proposeEC_j for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$. We impose that the
 394 validity predicate P of the blocktree ADT (see Section 3) be equal to predicate P_{EC} . When
 395 a correct process p invokes the $\text{proposeEC}_j(v)$ operation of \mathcal{P}_1 , for any $j \in \mathbb{N}$, then p executes
 396 the following sequence of three steps: (i) p invokes the $\text{append}(v)$ operation of \mathcal{P}_2 , then (ii) p

invokes a sequence of `read()` operations up to the moment the `read()` returns a chain bc such that $bc[j] \neq \perp$, and finally (iii) p decides chain bc (i.e., it returns chain bc) and triggers the next operation `proposeECj+1(v')`. We now show that protocol \mathcal{P}_1 solves Eventual Consensus.

- **EC-Termination** This property is guaranteed by the ever growing tree property.
- **EC-Integrity** This property follows directly from the transformation.
- **EC-Validity** This property follows by construction and by the chain validity property since predicate P equals to predicate P_{EC} .
- **EC-Agreement** This property follows by the eventual strong prefix property, which guarantees that there exists a `read()` operation r such that all the subsequent ones return blockchains that are each prefix of the following one. In other words, eventually there is agreement on the value contained in $bc[j]$. This implies that there exists k for which all `proposeECj` with $j \geq k$ return the same value to all correct processes.

► **Theorem 12.** *There does not exist any solution that solves $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ in an asynchronous system with at least one Byzantine process.*

Proof. The proof follows from the relationship between the $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ and eventual immediate finality (EIF). EIF is not weaker than the Eventual Consensus problem (cf. Theorem 11), which is equivalent to the leader election problem [9], which cannot be solved in an asynchronous system with at least one Byzantine process [23].

5 Eventual Finality Solutions

In this section we first show the impossibility of solving \mathcal{EF}^* when the `append` operation, in case of forks, selects the "longest" chain. We then provide the first solution to \mathcal{EF}^* with an unbounded number of Byzantine processes using an alternative selection rule.

5.1 Impossibility of Eventual Finality with the Longest Chain Rule

In the following we prove that, in an asynchronous environment, we cannot provide \mathcal{EF}^* if, in case of forks, the `append` selection function $f_a()$ follows the longest chain rule, i.e., returns the longest chain of the blockchain tree. Obviously we assume that blocks are not created using the Consensus abstraction: With Consensus, immediate finality is easily ensured, and thus no fork will ever occur. Thus, when the Consensus abstraction cannot be implemented (due to the adversity of the environment), many blockchain systems adopt a selection function f_a based on the longest chain. For instance, in proof-of-work systems such as Bitcoin, selected chains are the ones that have required the most amount of work, which is equivalent to the longest chains when the difficulty is constant. In Ethereum, while the selection rule is based on heaviest sub-tree of the blockchain tree, or in proof-of-stake systems like EOS [12] or Tezos [11], the same argument applies.

To show this impossibility result, we consider a scenario in which the occurrence of any fork produces at most two alternative chains (this is often referred to as a branching factor of 2). We consider a finite number of processes and an `append` selection function f_a that in case of forks deterministically selects the longest chain through the `length` function (see Section 3.2.2), and in case of a tie selects the chain following any deterministic rule (for instance the chain whose last block has the smallest digest). We show that it is impossible to guarantee \mathcal{EF}^* for such `append` selection function f_a .

Intuitively, the impossibility follows from the fact that with the longest chain selection rule, races can occur between different branches in the tree. We show that as forks may

441 occur, we can create two infinite branches sharing only the root. One or the other branch
 442 constitutes alternatively the longest chain and `append` operations select chains from each
 443 branch alternatively. This is enough to show that the only common prefix that is returned is
 444 the root hence, violating eventual finality.

445 To capture the synchronisation power of the system, we abstract the deterministic creation
 446 of new blocks and their addition to the blockchain within an oracle. This oracle is the only
 447 generator of valid blocks, and regulates the number of appended children from a same
 448 parent. The same approach has been proposed in [1]. The branching factor of an oracle
 449 is the maximal number of children that can be appended to a block. The oracle owns a
 450 synchronization power equal to Consensus if its branching factor is equal to 1. The oracle
 451 grants access to the blocktree as a shared object, through the following three operations:
 452 `update_view()` returns the current state of the blocktree; `getValidBlock(b_i, b_j)` returns a valid
 453 block b'_j , constructed from b_j , that can be appended to block b_i , where b_i is already included
 454 in the blocktree; and `setValidBlock(b_i, b'_j)` appends the valid block b'_j to b_i , and returns \top
 455 when the block is successfully appended and \perp otherwise. The following theorem shows that,
 456 even with this strong oracle (that allows to have a bounded branching factor in contrast to
 457 PoW approaches), we cannot reach eventual finality if we rely on the longest chain rule to
 458 resolve forks.

459 ► **Theorem 13.** *It is impossible to guarantee \mathcal{EF}^* if the `append` operation is based on the*
 460 *longest chain rule in an asynchronous environment.*

461 **Proof.** The interested reader is invited to read the proof in the Appendix of this paper. ◀

462 5.2 Asynchronous Solution to \mathcal{EF}^* with an Unbounded Number of 463 Byzantine Processes

464 We consider an asynchronous system with a possibly infinite set of processes which can
 465 append infinitely many blocks, and processes can be affected by Byzantine failures. Each
 466 process has a unique identifier $i \in \mathbb{N}$ and is equipped with signatures that can be used to
 467 identify the message sender identifier. Each block is identified with the identifier of the
 468 process that created it. Block identifier is inserted in the header of the block. Moreover, since
 469 it has been proven that reliable communications are necessary to ensure eventual finality [1],
 470 we assume that each process is equipped with an Eventually Reliable Broadcast primitive
 471 that satisfies the following two properties: If a correct process p broadcasts a message m
 472 then p eventually delivers m and if a correct process p delivers m then all correct processes
 473 eventually deliver m . Such a primitive can be implemented by organizing the infinite set
 474 of processes in a topology in which for each pair of correct processes, there exists a path
 475 composed by only correct processes [19]. Thus, we do not require any assumptions on the
 476 proportion between Byzantine and correct processes in the system but on the way those
 477 processes are arranged on the network topology.

478 The main idea of Algorithm 1 consists in using local selection functions f_a and f_r for
 479 `append` and `read` operations respectively and characterizing blocks by their parents and
 480 producer signatures.

481 To perform an `append` operation of a block b , correct processes extend the chain returned
 482 by function f_a applied on their current view of bt with b , i.e., $f_a(bt) \frown b$, and `rb-broadcast`
 483 $f_a(bt) \frown b$. When a process `rb-delivers` a blockchain bc , it calls `bt.addIfValid(bc)` that merges bc
 484 with bt if the former is valid. By merging bc with bt we mean that for each block b_i of bc
 485 starting from the genesis block b_0 , if b_i is not present in bt then b_i is added to bt , i.e., b_i is
 486 added to the block of bt whose hash is equal to the one contained in b_i 's header. A `read()`

■ **Algorithm 1** \mathcal{EF}^* with an unbounded number of Byzantine processes

```

1 upon rb-delivery( $bc$ )
2   | bt.addIfValid( $bc$ )
3 end
4 upon append( $b$ )
5   | rb-broadcast( $f_a(bt) \frown b$ )
6 end
7 upon read()
8   | return  $f_r(bt)$ 
9 end

```

487 operation triggered by a correct process p returns the chain selected by f_r on the current
488 blocktree bt of p . Given a blocktree bt , the append selection function f_a selects a chain in bt
489 by going from the root (i.e., genesis block) to a leaf, choosing at each fork b_i the edge to the
490 child with the lowest identifier. If more than one child have the same identifier (i.e., they
491 have been created by the same process), then all of them are ignored. If all the children have
492 the same identifier, then f_a returns the chain from the genesis block to b_i . Blocks are ranked
493 by the creator identifier, in the domain of the natural number and thus lower bounded by 0.
494 Then even though, an infinite number of blocks is added continuously to a fork, there is not,
495 for a given block, an infinite number of blocks with a smaller identifier. Thus eventually the
496 selection function f_a will always select the same prefix. Finally, since blocks are diffused by
497 an eventually reliable broadcast primitive, eventually all correct processes will have the same
498 view of the blocktree. When a process invokes the `read()` operation, it returns the blockchain
499 selected by the read selection function f_r applied to its current view of the blocktree. By
500 imposing that $f_r = f_a$, then eventually all the processes, when reading, will select the same
501 prefix.

502 ► **Theorem 14.** *Algorithm 1 is a solution for \mathcal{EF}^* in an asynchronous system with a possibly*
503 *infinite set of processes which can append infinitely many blocks, and suffer from an unbounded*
504 *number of Byzantine failures.*

505 **Proof.** We show by construction that Algorithm 1 solves \mathcal{EF}^* in an asynchronous system
506 with a possibly infinite set of processes which can append infinitely many blocks, and can
507 suffer an unbounded number of Byzantine failures. Intuitively, despite the unbounded number
508 of blocks in each fork, by the eventually reliable broadcast, eventually for each fork all correct
509 processes have the same block with the smallest identifier. Hence, by the read selection
510 function f_r that at each fork selects the block with the smallest identifier in order to select
511 the chain to return, eventually, at all correct processes, function f_r returns the blockchain
512 having a common increasing prefix. Let p_1, p_2, \dots , be a possibly infinite set of processes,
513 such that each one maintains its local view bt_i of blocktree bt by running Algorithm 1. Then
514 for any correct process p_i the following properties hold.

- 515 ■ **Chain validity:** it is satisfied by function `bt.addIfValid(bc)` that merges blockchain bc to
516 bt_i only if the former is valid.
- 517 ■ **Chain integrity:** The `read()` operation returns the chain of blocks selected by function
518 f_r applied to bt_i . By Line 2 of Algorithm 1, only valid blocks are locally added to bt_i
519 once they have been reliably delivered. By Algorithm 1, the only place at which blocks
520 are reliably broadcast is in the `append()` operation.
- 521 ■ **Eventual prefix:** This property follows from the definition of f_a and the eventually

522 reliable broadcast primitive. Thanks to the latter, for any b in the bt of a correct process
 523 p , eventually all correct processes deliver b . Let t_b be the time after which no process can
 524 append further blocks b_{child} to b such that b_{child} is part of the chain returned by f_a . This
 525 time t_b always exists, as for each block b having potentially infinitely many children we
 526 have, by definition of function f_a , that $f_a(bt)$ selects a chain in bt by going from the root
 527 to a leaf, choosing at each fork b the edge to the child with the lowest identifier. Since
 528 identifiers are lower bounded by 0, eventually function f_a will always select the same
 529 child b' of b . The same argument applies for b' and its children. Hence, if any two correct
 530 processes invoke the read operation infinitely many times, then as $f_r = f_a$, eventually
 531 they return chains that satisfy the eventual prefix property.

532 ■ **Ever growing tree:** This property relies on the fact that each fork has a finite number
 533 of blocks since there are finitely many processes and each (Byzantine or correct) process
 534 can contribute with at most one block per parent as multiple children created by the same
 535 process are ignored by f_a . Thus, eventually, new blocks contribute to the tree growth.

536

537 5.3 Eventually Synchronous Solution to $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ with less than half of 538 Byzantine Processes

539 In this section we prove that $\mathcal{EF}^{\diamond c}$ is solvable in an eventually synchronous message-passing
 540 system with less than $n/2$ Byzantine processes, where n is the number of processes.

541 We propose an algorithm, called \mathcal{AF} for Accountable Forking. This algorithm is inspired
 542 by the Streamlet [6] algorithm. Streamlet [6] assumes the presence of less than a third of
 543 Byzantine processes and an eventually synchronous system with a known message delay Δ
 544 after GST. Algorithm \mathcal{AF} relies on weaker assumptions: we assume the presence of only
 545 a majority of correct processes and we do not explicitly use bound Δ . We suppose that
 546 processes have access to the eventually reliable broadcast presented in Section 5.2. Prior to
 547 presenting our algorithm, let us first describe the original Streamlet.

548 **The Streamlet Algorithm.** The Streamlet algorithm works in an eventually syn-
 549 chronous system with a known message delay Δ and a finite set of n processes. In particular,
 550 before the Global Stabilisation Time (GST), message delays can be arbitrary; however, after
 551 GST, messages sent by correct processes are guaranteed to be received by correct processes
 552 within Δ time units. Each epoch, composed of 2Δ time units, has a designated leader chosen
 553 at random by a publicly known hash function. Each block b is labelled with the epoch
 554 ($b.epoch$) at which it has been created. This allows processes to determine whether block b
 555 has been created by a legitimate leader. The protocol works as follows:

- 556 ■ **Propose-Vote.** In every epoch:
- 557 ■ The epoch's designated leader proposes a new block and reliably broadcasts it, extending
 558 the longest notarized chain (defined below) it has seen, or breaking ties arbitrarily if
 559 they have the same height.
 - 560 ■ Each process votes (rb-broadcasts a vote) for the first proposal it sees from the epoch's
 561 leader, as long as the proposed block extends (one of) the longest notarized chain(s)
 562 that the voter has seen. A vote is a signature on the proposed block.
 - 563 ■ When a block gains votes from at least $2n/3$ distinct processes, it becomes notarized.
 564 A chain is notarized if its constituent blocks are all notarized.
- 565 ■ **Finalize.** Notarized does not mean final. If in any notarized chain, there are three
 566 adjacent blocks with consecutive epoch numbers, the prefix of the chain up to the second
 567 of the three blocks is considered final. When a block becomes final, all of its prefixes
 568 must be final too.

569 **The Accountable Forking (\mathcal{AF}) Algorithm.** The \mathcal{AF} algorithm extends Streamlet by
 570 guaranteeing that for any given fork, correct processes can blame the process that originates
 571 it, i.e, a Byzantine process creating a fork is accountable for it. This is achieved as follows:
 572 First, we only require that a block gains votes from a majority of distinct processes to
 573 become notarized, which means that forks can occur. The second modification we propose
 574 goes deeper: if a fork occurs, any correct processes can detect the Byzantine process that
 575 originated it, and excludes it from the voters. Specifically, when two conflicting chains are
 576 finalized (i.e., two finalized chains that are not the prefix of one another) then processes look
 577 for inconsistent blocks. By definition, two notarized blocks b, b' are inconsistent with one
 578 another if one of the following two conditions holds:

- 579 ■ **Condition 1.** b and b' share the same epoch, i.e, $b.epoch = b'.epoch$;
- 580 ■ **Condition 2.** either $((b.epoch < b'.epoch) \text{ and } (b.height > b'.height))$ or $((b'.epoch <$
 581 $b.epoch) \text{ and } (b'.height > b.height))$. Function height counts the number of blocks from
 582 the genesis block.

583 If a process votes for blocks inconsistent with one another then it is detected as Byzantine.
 584 Once a correct process p detects a Byzantine process q , p ignores all messages coming from
 585 q . Since all messages received by a correct process q are eventually received by any correct
 586 process, then all of them do the same with respect to q .

587 ► **Theorem 15.** *There exists a solution that solves eventual immediate finality in an eventually*
 588 *synchronous system with less than $n/2$ Byzantine processes, where n is the number of processes*
 589 *participating to the algorithm.*

590 **Proof.** We show that algorithm \mathcal{AF} is such a solution.

591 Let us first demonstrate that voting for two inconsistent blocks b and b' is a Byzantine
 592 failure. We have two cases to consider. If both b and b' are inconsistent because Condition 1
 593 holds, then the intersecting voters are Byzantine as correct processes vote only once per epoch.
 594 Hence if process q votes for b and b' then q is Byzantine. If both b and b' are inconsistent
 595 because Condition 2 is met, then the intersecting voters are Byzantine, as correct processes
 596 vote only for blocks extending one of the longest notarized chains. That is, if correct process
 597 p votes for b it means that b is extending a notarized block b_{pred} that is of height $b.height - 1$,
 598 therefore p cannot vote afterwards for a block b' whose height is strictly smaller than $b.height$
 599 because p must extend one of the longest notarized chain. It follows that if process q votes
 600 for both b and b' then q is Byzantine.

601 Let us now show that a fork occurs because of two inconsistent blocks. If there is a
 602 fork then this gives rise to two sequences of three adjacent blocks with consecutive epochs,
 603 b_1, b_2, b_3 and b'_1, b'_2, b'_3 (by construction given the finalization rule). If no blocks share the
 604 same epoch number then we can assume w.l.o.g. that $b_3.epoch < b'_1.epoch$. Let block b'
 605 belonging to the prefix of b'_3 such that $b'.epoch > b_1.epoch$ and $b'.height$ is the smallest in the
 606 prefix of b'_3 . Such block always exists as b'_1 satisfies those two conditions. We have two cases:
 607 Either $b'.height < b_3.height$ or $b'.height \geq b_3.height$. In the former case, b' is inconsistent
 608 with b_3 since by assumption $b'.epoch > b_3.epoch$. In the latter case, the predecessor of b'
 609 is inconsistent with b_3 . Indeed, the predecessor of b' has a strictly smaller height than b_1
 610 and by assumption has a larger epoch number than b_3 . Figure 1 illustrates the presence
 611 of inconsistent blocks in presence of a fork at some block b_c . From b_c two chains are built,
 612 the first one consisting of the sequence of three blocks b_1, b_2 and b_3 , and the second chain
 613 consisting of four consecutive blocks b_d, b'_1, b'_2, b'_3 (to illustrate the first case) and of five
 614 consecutive blocks $b_d, b_e, b'_1, b'_2, b'_3$ (to illustrate the second case). In both cases block b'_1 plays
 615 the role of block b' . In the first case (figure in the top), $b_3.height = 6$ and $b'.height = 5$ while




Figure 1 Illustration of block inconsistencies due to the occurrence of a fork when the finalized blocks are not labelled with the same epoch. Epochs are on the x axis, and all consecutive blocks have consecutive epochs, e.g., b_c and b_d have four epochs of difference, 4 and 7 respectively, while b_1 and b_2 are labelled with consecutive epochs.

616 $b_3.epoch = 6$ and $b'.height = 5$. Thus Condition 2 applies. In the second case (figure in
 617 the bottom), since $b'.height \geq b_3.height$ then there must exist some block b_e in the b' prefix.
 618 Thus $b_e.height < b'.height$. Given that by assumption $b_e.epoch > b_3.epoch$, then Condition 2
 619 holds for b_e and b_3 . Hence there is always a couple of inconsistent blocks in a fork.


620 Let us now conclude our proof that protocol \mathcal{AF} solves eventual immediate finality. If a
 621 fork occurs, then each correct process eventually detects at least one Byzantine process and
 622 ignores its votes. Thus, the number of forks is finite since we have a finite number of Byzantine
 623 processes. As a consequence, there is always a single chain that is eventually finalized. As
 624 there is a majority of correct processes, algorithm \mathcal{AF} remains live as the original Streamlet
 625 one. Algorithm \mathcal{AF} also inherits the properties of the original Streamlet algorithm regarding
 626 the eventual finalization of blocks when the system becomes synchronous. ◀

6 Conclusion

628 In this work we have focused on the formalisation of eventual finality, which ensures that
 629 selected main chains at different processes share a common increasing prefix. We have
 630 formalised different forms of eventual finality in terms of the maximal number of blocks
 631 that can be revoked at each reconciliation, which is a crux in current blockchain designs.
 632 We have formally shown that in an asynchronous system is not possible to reach a bound
 633 on the number of blocks that can be revoked. On the other hand, we proposed for the
 634 first time a solution in an eventually synchronous system with less than half of Byzantine
 635 processes guaranteeing that such bound is reached eventually. We have also shown that in
 636 an asynchronous system eventual finality with no bound on the number of revocable blocks
 637 cannot be solved using the reconciliation rule of Bitcoin. Still we provide an asynchronous
 638 solution with an unlimited number of Byzantine processes. We hope that this work will
 639 better guide blockchain designs.

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■ **Figure 2** A blocktree generated by two processes. On the x-axis the longest chain value of each chain at different time instants (from the root to the current leaf) and the relationships between those values.

691 Appendix

692 **Theorem 13** It is impossible to guarantee \mathcal{EF}^* if the append operation is based on the
 693 longest chain rule in an asynchronous environment.

694 **Proof.** In the proof we consider the stronger oracle allowing the occurrence of one fork, i.e.,
 695 an oracle with branching factor equal to 2. That is, this oracle allows for two valid blocks to
 696 be appended to the same parent. If the oracle receives new requests to append additional
 697 blocks to this parent, it shall return \perp to all such requests.

698 Let p_1 and p_2 be two processes trying to append infinitely many blocks. Without loss of
 699 generality, we carry out this proof with a length function that counts the number of blocks
 700 from the genesis block.

701 We illustrate our proof with Figure 2. At time t_0 , for both p_1 and p_2 , the `update_view()`
 702 of bt equals b_0 , thus when both apply the append selection function f_a on it to select the leaf
 703 where to append the new block, they both get b_0 . Then they both call `getValidBlock($b_0, b_{i,1}$) =`
 704 b'_i , where $i = 1$ for p_1 and $i = 2$ for p_2 . At time $t_1 > t_0$, p_1 and p_2 are poised to call
 705 `setValidBlock($b_0, b'_{i,1}$)`. We then let p_1 call `setValidBlock($b_0, b'_{1,1}$)`, which must return \top and
 706 hence $b'_{1,1}$ is appended to b_0 . Process p_1 then proceeds to append a new block $b_{1,2}$, i.e., after
 707 having updated its bt 's view, through the `update_view()` function, p_1 applies the append
 708 selection function f_a on it to select the leaf where to append its new block, in this case the
 709 only leaf is $b'_{1,1}$. It calls `getValidBlock($b'_{1,1}, b_{1,2}$)` function which returns $\{b'_{1,2}\}$ and it is poised
 710 to call `setValidBlock($b'_{1,1}, b'_{1,2}$)`.

711 We let p_1 continue to append new blocks until some time t_2 at which it is poised to
 712 call `setValidBlock($b'_{1,h}, b'_{1,h+1}$)`, with $h = 1$, such that the length of the chain $b_0, \dots, b'_{1,h+1}$
 713 would be greater than or would have the same length but a smaller lexicographical order
 714 than the chain $b_0, b'_{2,1}$ if $b'_{2,1}$ were already appended to block b_0 . Afterwards, at time $t_3 \geq t_2$,
 715 we let p_2 resume and complete its call to `setValidBlock($b_0, b'_{2,1}$)` which must also succeed
 716 and return \top as our oracle has a branching factor of 2. By construction, p_2 sees the two
 717 branches in its following `update_view()` of bt (i.e., chain $b_0, b'_{1,h}$ with $h = 1$, and chain $b_0, b'_{2,1}$)
 718 of the same length thus the selection function f_a selects the branch $b_0, b'_{2,1}$ for where to
 719 append the next block as block $b'_{2,1}$ is smaller than $b'_{1,h}$ in the lexicographical order. We
 720 let p_2 append blocks to this branch until some time t_4 at which it becomes poised to call
 721 `setValidBlock($b'_{2,c}, b'_{2,c+1}$)` with $c = 2$ such that the length of the chain $b_0, \dots, b'_{2,c}$ is smaller
 722 than the chain $b_0, \dots, b'_{1,h+1}$, or in case of equal length has a higher lexicographical order,
 723 and such that the length of the chain $b_0, \dots, b'_{2,c+1}$ is greater than the chain $b_0, \dots, b'_{1,h+1}$,
 724 or in case of equal length has a smaller lexicographical order.

725 As before, it is time to stop the execution of p_2 and resume the execution of p_1 and
 726 to let it complete its call to `setValidBlock($b'_{1,h}, b'_{1,h+1}$)`. We can continue to create two

727 infinite branches sharing only the root by alternatively letting p_1 and p_2 extend their own
728 branch while stopping one and resuming the execution of the other each time its length
729 would overcome the length of the other branch extended with the pending block (and the
730 appropriate lexicographical orderings in case of equal length). This way we construct a tree
731 composed of two infinite branches sharing only the root b_0 as common prefix. It is easy to
732 see that we can integrate read operations that may return the current chain from any branch
733 as both branches are temporarily the longest one. Thus, the common prefix never increases,
734 and so, the eventual finality consistency criterion is not satisfied.

735 It is important to note that with any **length** function that increases monotonically with
736 prefixes (e.g, the length function could count the total number of transactions that belong to
737 the blocks on the same branch) then this scenario still holds. In that case h and c in the
738 proof could be larger than 1 and 2 respectively. ◀