Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2025

A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Johannes Horner
Jérôme Renault

Résumé

We provide the Folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public signals, with a small variation of the usual assumptions for finitely repeated games with perfect observation, and for discounted repeated games with public signals. Our proof uses using standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public correlation device. Three counterexamples show that our assumptions are tight.
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Dates et versions

hal-04875858 , version 1 (09-01-2025)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04875858 , version 1

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Johannes Horner, Jérôme Renault. A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring. 2025. ⟨hal-04875858⟩
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